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Domestic Relations Cases in Federal
Court: Toward a Principled Exercise
of Jurisdiction
By BARBARA ANN ATWOOD*
The federal courts have long viewed domestic relations litigation
as beyond their competence, even though such cases often meet the
statutory prerequisites for federal subject-matter jurisdiction.' The
courts refuse to grant a divorce, award alimony or child support, or
determine child custody even when diversity of citizenship may other-
wise support federal jurisdiction.2 Federal courts have also dismissed
claims to enforce or to nullify alimony and custody decrees obtained in
state court,3 claims to enforce property rights acquired during mar-
riage,4 interspousal tort and contract claims,5 and other claims tangen-
* Assistant Professor, University of Houston Law Center. B.A., 1969, Mary Baldwin
College; J.D., 1976, University of Arizona.
1. See generally 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3609 (1975) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER]; P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN,
D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 1189-92 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as HART & WECHSLER]; Vestal &
Foster, Implied Limitations on the Diversity Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, 41 MINN. L. REV.
1, 23-31 (1956). The doctrine is usually referred to as a jurisdictional "exception" or "limita-
tion," see, e.g., Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F.2d 1018, 1021 (3d Cir. 1975), and such terminol-
ogy is used in this Article for convenience.
A limitation on federal court jurisdiction has also been recognized for probate matters,
see generally HART & WECHSLER, supra, at 1183-89, and has been aptly termed "one of the
most mysterious and esoteric branches of the law of federal jurisdiction," see Dragan v.
Miller, 679 F.2d 712, 713 (7th Cir. 1982). Although the probate and domestic relations ex-
ceptions share some common roots, see infra notes 39, 98, the probate exception is viewed as
uniquely dependent upon the intricacies of individual state laws concerning the administra-
tion of decendents' estates, see 13 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra, § 3610.
2. See Crouch v. Crouch, 566 F.2d 486, 487 (5th Cir. 1978). See generally 13 WRIGHT
& MILLER, supra note 1, § 3609.
3. See, e.g., Bennett v. Bennett, 682 F.2d 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (injunction to compel
compliance with custody decree); Sutter v. Pitts, 639 F.2d 842 (1st Cir. 1981) (enforcement of
custody decree).
4. See, e.g., Bossom v. Bossom, 551 F.2d 474 (2d Cir. 1976) (attempt to modify state
divorce decree concerning, inter alia, disposition of marital home).
5. See, e.g., Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F.2d 1018 (3d Cir. 1975) (breach of separation
agreement); Gargallo v. Gargallo, 487 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1973) (interspousal tort suit for
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tially involving domestic relations issues6 even though diversity of
citizenship jurisdiction or federal question jurisdiction is present.7 The
courts usually justify their dismissal of these actions on the ground that
there is a jurisdictional "exception" or "limitation" for domestic rela-
tions cases.8 Despite the federal courts' entrenched antipathy to do-
mestic relations litigation, parties continue to bring their interspousal
and custody battles to the federal arena with surprising frequency.9
The reported decisions reveal few attempts to obtain a divorce in
federal court.'0 Rather, the most frequently reported scenarios involve
post-divorce disputes over property divisions, support obligations, or
child custody. For example, an individual, having established a domi-
cile in a state different from that of his or her former spouse, may bring
an action in federal court against the former spouse to enforce the
terms of a property agreement" or to modify a state court custody or
support decree.' 2 Although the claim for relief requires the court to
apply state substantive law, the plaintiff may believe that the federal
court will provide a more neutral or fairer forum than would the state
court.' 3 Alternatively, a plaintiff may seek damages in federal court
against a former spouse for tortious interference with custody rights
14
perjury, conversion, and malicious prosecution); Cherry v. Cherry, 438 F. Supp. 88 (D. Md.
1977) (breach of separation agreement).
6. See, e.g., Huffman v. Nebraska Bureau of Vital Statistics, 320 F. Supp. 154 (D.
Neb. 1970) (prisoner's action to declare marriage valid for purposes of nullifying alleged
wife's testimony against him).
7. Domestic relations issues often surface in the context of civil rights actions, and the
courts frequently invoke the exception as the basis for dismissal. See, e.g., Peterson v. Bab-
bitt, 708 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1983) (prisoner complaint regarding visitation rights).
8. See, e.g., Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F.2d 1018, 1021 (3d Cir. 1975).
9. The fact that almost every federal court of appeals in recent years has issued an
opinion on the domestic relations exception evidences the frequency with which domestic
relations litigants attempt to be heard in federal court. See Lloyd v. Loeffler, 694 F.2d 489
(7th Cir. 1982); Bennett v. Bennett, 682 F.2d 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Csibi v. Fustos, 670 F.2d
134 (9th Cir. 1982); Sutter v. Pitts, 639 F.2d 842 (1st Cir. 1981); Jagiella v. Jagiella, 647 F.2d
561 (5th Cir. 1981); Cole v. Cole, 633 F.2d 1083 (4th Cir. 1980); Bergstrom v. Bergstrom, 623
F.2d 517 (8th Cir. 1980); Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1978); Solomon v.
Solomon, 516 F.2d 1018 (3d Cir. 1975); Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin, Krim & Ballon v. Rosen-
stiel, 490 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1973). The large number of reported federal decisions in domes-
tic relations cases indicates the great volume of such litigation. The decisions are collected
at 13 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, § 3609.
10. See generally 13 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note I, § 3609.
11. Cf. Firestone v. Cleveland Trust Co., 654 F.2d 1212, 1215-18 (6th Cir. 1981) (suit to
enforce alimony terms of divorce decree).
12. See, e.g., Stevens v. Sley, 407 F. Supp. 140, 142-45 (E.D. Penn. 1976).
13. See infra note 248.
14. See, e.g., Lloyd v. Loeffler, 694 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1982).
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or for breach of a separation agreement.' 5 In any of these situations, if
the statutory elements of diversity of citizenship and minimum amount
in controversy can be met, jurisdiction would seem to exist. 16 Yet,
many federal courts have seized upon the domestic relations "excep-
tion" as a ready justification for dismissing such actions.
A federal court litigant might also allege a deprivation of civil
rights by state officials in connection with a child custody or marital
property dispute. For example, a noncustodial parent might contend
that a state court's denial of custody constituted a due process viola-
tion,17 giving rise to federal question jurisdiction if the claim is substan-
tial.18 Nevertheless, some courts have applied the domestic relations
exception in the federal question context. 19
The Supreme Court has never squarely endorsed a broad jurisdic-
tional exception for domestic relations cases. The doctrine is largely
the creation of the lower courts and, as such, is poorly defined and
unevenly applied.20 The reluctance to entertain domestic relations
15. See, e.g., Crouch v. Crouch, 566 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1978).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976).
17. Cf. Franks v. Smith, 717 F.2d 183, 185-86 (5th Cir. 1983) (civil rights action for
wrongful deprivation of custody of child and for fourth amendment violation in connection
with taking of child).
18. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 683-85 (1946).
19. See infra notes 336-37.
20. The judge-made doctrine was the subject of a proposal that was considered and
ultimately rejected by the American Law Institute. A proposed addition to the federal judi-
cial code would have stripped the district courts of jurisdiction over "actions arising under
the law of any state concerning domestic relations." See A.L.I., STUDY OF THE DIvISION OF
JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURT § 1330(2) (Tent. Draft No. 6 1968)
[hereinafter cited as A.L.I. STUDY]. The proposed section also included a jurisdictional ex-
ception for probate and competency proceedings and actions arising under worker's com-
pensation laws. See id. § 1330 (1), (3)-(4). Although the debate on the floor of the Institute
focused on the probate exception, see 45 A.L.I. PROC. 99-145 (1969), a modification of the
proposed domestic relations exception was offered that would have made the language of
§ 1330(2) more explicit: "Proceedings for divorce, separation, alimony or custody of children
where the rights sought to be enforced arise under the laws of any state." See id. at 117
(remarks of Professor Field, relaying a suggestion by Judge Weinstein). After the Institute
was unable to reach a consensus on the wording or scope of the proposed § 1330, the section
was deleted. See id. at 145.
The elimination of all diversity jurisdiction by Congress, see, e.g., H.R. 3689, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), would in itself remove most domestic relations cases from federal
court cognizance. The continuing controversy over such proposals, however, makes it un-
likely that Congress will act in the near future. Compare, e.g., Rowe, Abolishing Diversity
Jurisdiction: Positive Side Effects and Potentialfor Further Re/orms, 92 HARV. L. REv. 963
(1979), with Frank, The Casefor Diversity Jurisdiction, 16 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 403 (1979).
But see Westen & Lehman, Is There Lfefor Erie After the Death of Diversiy?, 78 MICH. L.
REv. 311, 311 n.1 (1980) (predicting that the 97th Congress would adopt a proposal to abol-
ish diversity jurisdiction).
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cases originated in nineteenth century Supreme Court dicta concerning
the scope of the federal court's law and equity jurisdiction.2' Through
the years the lower courts developed varying approaches to the ques-
tion of domestic relations litigation, setting forth Delphic distinctions
between cases deemed suitable for federal court cognizance and those
deemed exclusively the domain of the states. 22 Today concerns of fed-
eralism provide the primary basis for the exception.
23
This Article traces the development of the domestic relations ex-
ception from its ambiguous origins in early Supreme Court dicta to the
uncontained doctrine presently endorsed by many lower courts. First,
the Article analyzes the pertinent Supreme Court authority and tradi-
tional rationales for the exception. It then examines the contemporary
justifications relied on by the lower courts for continued adherence to
the doctrine. Finally, the Article outlines an alternative approach to
the question of federal court competence in domestic relations matters.
This Article argues that by refusing to hear cases that fall within
their statutory grants of jurisdiction, the federal courts are undermining
a basic tenet of their institutional role-that they must exercise the ju-
risdiction assigned to them by Congress. 24 No valid jurisdictional the-
ory justifies automatic invocation of the domestic relations exception in
every case involving an intra-family dispute. Moreover, the domestic
21. See Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162, 167 (1899); In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94
(1890); Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 206 (1888); Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582,
584 (1859); see also Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379 (1930).
22. Some courts have distinguished between "core" domestic relations cases and "pe-
ripheral" domestic relations cases, e.g., Lloyd v. Loeffler, 694 F.2d 489, 492 (7th Cir. 1982),
while others have applied the exception to cases "on the verge" of a basic domestic relations
dispute, e.g., Kilduffv. Kilduff, 473 F. Supp. 873, 875 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), and to cases where
the "primary issue" is a question of family status, e.g., Csibi v. Fustos, 670 F.2d 134, 137 (9th
Cir. 1982) (quoting Beuchold v. Ortiz, 401 F.2d 371 (9th Cir. 1968)).
23. See infra notes 177-81 & accompanying text.
24. The Supreme Court characterized the federal courts' institutional duty in Colorado
River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976), as "the virtually un-
flagging obligation of the federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction given them," id. at 817.
The Court recently reaffirmed this view in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Corp., 103 S. Ct. 927 (1983), where the Court held that a district court had abused its
discretion in staying an arbitration action pending disposition of a parallel state court pro-
ceeding. In the earlier case of Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943), the Court
similarly made clear that a refusal to exercise jurisdiction is proper only in exceptional
circumstances:
In the absence of some recognized public policy or defined principle guiding the
exercise of the jurisdiction conferred, which would in exceptional cases warrant its
non-exercise, it has from the first been deemed to be the duty of the federal courts,
if their jurisdiction is properly invoked, to decide questions of state law whenever




relations nature of a controversy does not by itself justify a discretion-
ary refusal to exercise jurisdiction. Once a federal court determines
that a case comes within its constitutional and statutory competence, it
should eschew the talismanic "domestic relations" characterization. Its
decision to entertain or dismiss a domestic relations case instead should
be made according to objective criteria and with an initial presumption
favoring the exercise of jurisdiction. Under carefully defined circum-
stances the various abstention doctrines provide a principled basis for
dismissing certain kinds of domestic relations claims. Use of the ab-
stention doctrines would result in a principled approach to and closer
analysis of domestic relations suits, without significantly increasing the
federal caseload.2
5
Supreme Court Precedent and the Traditional Rationales
The Early Cases
In the half dozen cases that constitute the source of the domestic
relations exception, the Supreme Court suggested in dicta that the fed-
eral courts lacked authority to grant divorces, 26 award alimony,27 or
25. Two recent critiques of the domestic relations exception ably discuss the problems
inherent in the federal courts' current approach, but each falls short of proposing a satisfac-
tory solution. In Note, The Domestic Relations Exception to Diversity Jurisdiction.- A Re-
Evaluation, 24 B.C.L. REv. 661 (1983) [hereinafter cited as B.C. Note], the author argues
that the domestic relations exception should be abolished but does not explore other existing
doctrines that may justify a federal court's refusal to entertain certain domestic relations
disputes. In Note, The Domestic Relations Exception to Diversity Jurisdiction, 83 COLUM. L.
REV. 1824 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Columbia Note], the author does propose two bases
for a limited "exception": a federal court should refuse to hear cases that do not present an
article III case or controversy and cases that require the court to act as representative of the
state in the exercise ofparenspatriae powers. Id. at 1851-53. The case or controversy re-
quirement, as the author suggests, raises doubts as to the justiciability of the uncontested
divorce when each party desires precisely the same relief. The question, however, is not free
from difficulty. The federal courts have long exercised the power to render consent decrees
and default judgments. See, e.g., Pope v. United States, 323 U.S. 1, 11 (1944) ("[w]hen a
plaintiff brings suit to enforce a legal obligation it is not any the less a case or controversy
upon which a court possessing the federal judicial power may rightly give judgment, because
the plaintiff's claim is uncontested or incontestable."); Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S.
311,325-26 (1928). Furthermore, there may be a very real need to secure a judicial decree as
to status or rights even though there is no dispute as to facts or remedy. See 13 WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 1, § 3530, at 167. Hence, the case or controversy requirement should not
bar article III jurisdiction over the uncontested or default divorce so long as the proceeding
involves genuinely adversary interests. The contention that a federal court may not enter-
tain cases that require it to act in a parens patriae role is likewise premised on an overly
narrow view of the powers of an article III court. See infra notes 162-69 & accompanying
text.
26. Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379 (1930).
27. Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1859).
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determine child custody.28 The actual holdings in these cases estab-
lished a much narrower limitation on federal jurisdiction, and the justi-
fications offered by the Court for its broad pronouncements on the
subject of domestic relations varied widely.
In Barber v. Barber,29 the first case in which the Court addressed
the authority of federal courts to entertain domestic relations matters, a
wife brought a diversity action against her estranged husband to en-
force a prior state court decree awarding her alimony. At the outset,
the Court emphasized that the plaintiff did not seek allowance of ali-
mony; she simply wanted to prevent her husband from fraudulently
defeating an earlier decree.30 The Court then set down its well-known
dictum: "We disclaim altogether any jurisdiction in the courts of the
United States upon the subject of divorce, or for the allowance of ali-
mony, either as an original proceeding in chancery or as an incident to
divorce a vinculo, or to one from bed and board."' 31 Notwithstanding
the domestic relations nature of the suit, the Court went on to sustain
the exercise of federal jurisdiction and affirmed the district court's
judgment in favor of the plaintiff for alimony past due.32 The Court
reasoned that since the original state decree was rendered by a court
with jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties, the decree
could be enforced by an equitable action in federal court.33 In uphold-
ing the exercise of federal equity jurisdiction, the Court looked to the
powers of the English chancery courts34 to determine that the federal
court had the authority to enforce the alimony decree.
35
The Court explained that if the prerequisites of federal equity ju-
risdiction were met, the existence or absence of remedies under state
law would be irrelevant:
It is no objection to equity jurisdiction in the courts of the United
States, that there is a remedy under the local law, for the equity juris-
diction of the Federal courts is the same in all of the States, and is
not affected by the existence or non-existence of an equity jurisdic-
28. In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586 (1890).
29. 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1859).
30. Id. at 584.
31. Id. The Court provided no authority to support this broad statement.
32. Id. at 600.
33. Id. at 591.
34. This reference to English judicial authority, a familiar theme in the history of the
domestic relations exception, was endorsed by the Court early on in its interpretation of the
scope of federal court jurisdiction under the Judiciary Act. See, e.g., Story v. Livingston, 38
U.S. (13 Pet.) 357, 359 (1839); Robinson v. Campbell, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 211, 212 (1818); see
also infra note 39.
35. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 590-91.
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tion in the State tribunals.
36
The Court agreed with the lower court that the wife, after a decree of
formal separation, could acquire a domicile separate from that of her
husband and thereby avail herself of diversity jurisdiction in an action
against her husband in federal court.37 Barber, then, makes clear that a
federal court may entertain an enforcement action to compel the pay-
ment of alimony due under a prior state court decree if jurisdictional
prerequisites are satisfied, regardless of comparable remedies available
under state law.
In a dissent that later would provide a rationale for the domestic
relations exception, Justice Daniel vehemently objected to the exten-
sion of federal equity jurisdiction to matters of alimony.38 According
to the then prevailing view, the scope of federal jurisdiction in equity
was to be determined by reference to the recognized powers of the Eng-
lish chancery courts. 39 The statutory grant of jurisdiction to the federal
circuit courts in the Judiciary Act of 1789 provided the words of limita-
tion: section 11 granted diversity jurisdiction in "suits of a civil nature
at common law or in equity";40 actions that did not fall within the des-
ignated categories, as determined by reference to English judicial prac-
tice, were not within the competence of the federal courts. With regard
to domestic relations matters, Justice Daniel argued that the English
36. Id. at 592 (quoting Livingston v. Story, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 632 (1835)). This passage
takes on special importance in light of one modem rationale (the availability of adequate
state remedies) for the domestic relations exception. See infra note 181 & accompanying
text.
37. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 599-600.
38. Id. at 602-05 (Daniel, J., dissenting). Justice Daniel also disagreed with the major-
ity on the issue of the wife's capacity to acquire a separate domicile. Id. at 600-02.
39. Id. at 604. This traditional doctrine that once other jurisdictional prerequisites are
met, the federal courts have the same authority at common law and in equity as did Eng-
land's common law and chancery courts, guided jurisdictional disputes in areas other than
domestic relations. In formulating the probate exception to federal court jurisdiction, for
example, the Court relied on the generally exclusive jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts
in probate matters. See, e.g., Fontain v. Ravenel, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 369, 384 (1854). The
federal courts, however, are deemed competent to hear disputes interpares pertaining to the
validity of a will or a particular bequeath where the state has created such a right of action
that is enforceable independent of the probate proceedings. Sutton v. English, 246 U.S. 199,
205 (1918).
40. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78. In contrast to the statute, the
Constitution grants jurisdiction over "controversies between citizens of different states" and
does not impose a "law and equity" qualification. U.S. CONsT. art III, § 2. Although Chief
Justice Taney once argued that the "law and equity" language in the federal question clause
of article III modified the whole section, see Fontain v. Ravenel, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 369, 391,
393 (1854), such an argument ignores the text and punctuation of article III and has never
been accepted by a majority of the Court, see Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F.2d 1018, 1032-33
(3d Cir. 1975) (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
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ecclesiastical courts had exclusive jurisdiction over the subject of mar-
riage and divorce, including alimony.41 Thus, "as the jurisdiction of
the chancery in England does not extend to or embrace the subjects of
divorce and alimony, and as the jurisdiction of the courts of the United
States in chancery is bounded by that of the chancery in England,"
federal equity jurisdiction likewise did not extend to such matters.
42
Justice Daniels' dissent provided a rationale for the majority's broad
dictum and for later endorsements of the domestic relations
exception.43
In re Burrus,44 the second major decision in the development of
the domestic relations exception, involved a federal habeas corpus ac-
tion brought by a father to recover custody of his child from the child's
grandparents. After a federal district court issued the writ awarding
custody to the father, the grandparents violated the order and were
held in contempt.45 The grandfather then challenged his contempt
conviction in an original habeas corpus proceeding in the Supreme
Court, contending that the lower federal court lacked jurisdiction to
determine child custody.
46
In sustaining the grandfather's argument, the Court observed that
federal habeas jurisdiction extended only to cases in which a party was
"held in custody for an act done by or under the authority of' federal
law, or in which the imprisonment violated federal law.47 Applying
this standard to the facts before it, the Court stated:
[T]here was no pretence that the child was restrained of its liberty, or
that the grandfather withheld it from the possession and control of
the father, under or by virtue of any authority of the United States,
or that his possession of the child was in violation of the Constitution
or any law or treaty of the United States.
48
The narrow holding of In re Burrus was that the federal district court
lacked jurisdiction over the custody dispute because the father's habeas
41. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 604-05 (Daniel, J., dissenting). In fact, the ecclesiasti-
cal courts' broad jurisdiction in matrimonial causes extended beyond matters of divorce.
See 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *892-95.
42. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 605 (Daniel, J., dissenting).
43. See, e.g., Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379 (1930) (discussed infra notes
79-88 & accompanying text).
44. 136 U.S. 586 (1890).
45. Id. at 588-89.
46. Id. at 587-89. Recently, the Supreme Court again considered the issue whether
federal habeas corpus jurisdiction extends to child custody disputes. See Lehman v. Lycom-
ing County Children's Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 502 (1982) (discussed infra notes 115-25 &
accompanying text).
47. Burrus, 136 U.S. at 591.
48. Id. at 593.
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petition lacked the essential allegations. The case did not establish a
general exception to federal jurisdiction over custody matters. As in
Barber, however, the Burrus opinion included broad language on
which later courts have relied49:
The whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife,
parent and child, belong to the laws of the States and not to the laws
of the United States. [The instant dispute] is one in regard to which
neither the Congress of the United States nor any authority of the
United States has any special jurisdiction.
50
Because the quoted language immediately follows the passage in which
the Court finds the habeas corpus petition to be fatally flawed, the
Court is clearly referring to state and federal substantive law: no fed-
eral law governed custody disputes, and federal habeas jurisdiction did
not lie unless federal law was in some way implicated. The passage
should not be construed to mean that the federal court automatically
must surrender jurisdiction if a case otherwise within its authority in-
volves a custody dispute. Indeed, the Court expressly left open the
question of whether diversity of citizenship might be available as a ju-
risdictional basis in custody battles.
5'
Dicta in a series of decisions involving territorial divorces fur-
thered the domestic relations exception. Although it did not address
the federal jurisdiction issue, the Court in Maynard v. Hill52 upheld a
legislative divorce granted by the territorial assembly of Oregon against
49. See, e.g., Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F.2d 1018, 1022 (3d Cir. 1975).
50. Burrus, 136 U.S. at 593-94.
51. Id. at 596. The issue was left open because the original habeas corpus petition had
been filed in a federal district court. Under the first Judiciary Act, diversity cases were
assigned to the federal circuit courts. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78. It was
apparent, however, that the Court had doubts about the availability of diversity jurisdiction
in custody cases. The Court discussed Barry v. Mercein, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 103 (1847), in
which the Court had held that it lacked appellate jurisdiction over a custody case because
the appellant failed to satisfy the amount in controversy requirement. The Barry Court, per
Chief Justice Taney, reasoned that the custody dispute was "evidently utterly incapable of
being reduced to any standard of pecuniary value, as it rises superior to money considera-
tions." Id. at 119-20, quoted in Burrus, 136 U.S. at 595. The Burrus Court, moreover, took
the unusual step of including an entire circuit court opinion because of its analysis of the
diversity of citizenship issue. Burrus, 136 U.S. at 597-627. In In re Barry, 42 F. 113
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1844), petitioner argued that the custody dispute, though failing to satisfy the
federal habeas corpus statute, could still be heard as a diversity case. The circuit court
rejected the argument, reasoning in part that the federal court as a court of limited jurisdic-
tion could not exercise the common law functions ofparenspatriae in determining custody.
Id. at 118-20. See Burrus, 136 U.S. at 603-07 (quoting opinion of Judge Betts in Barry).
The parenspatriae analysis has given rise to a modem rationale for refusing federal court
jurisdiction over custody disputes. See infra notes 145, 155-63 & accompanying text.
52. 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
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the argument that the legislature lacked the power to effect a divorce.5 3
Relying primarily on historical sources to sustain the legislative decree,
Justice Field wrote for the Court that England's Parliament exercised
the power to grant an absolute divorce in colonial times and that the
ecclesiastical courts of England "were limited to the granting of di-
vorces from bed and board. ' 54 According to Justice Field, the "legisla-
tive assemblies of the colonies followed the example of Parliament and
treated the subject of divorce as "within their province. ' 55 Justice
Field emphasized that during colonial times the granting of divorces
was generally viewed as being under the legislature's control, and that
the courts were thus without authority unless the legislature expressly
assigned jurisdiction.
5 6
In Simms v. Simms, 57 a husband petitioned the territorial court of
Arizona for a divorce. The court not only denied the divorce but also
awarded the wife temporary alimony and attorney's fees.5 8 On appeal
to the Supreme Court, the husband challenged both aspects of the
judgment.59 The wife moved to dismiss the appeal on jurisdictional
grounds.60 The Court observed that the general exclusion of domestic
relations matters from federal judicial and legislative authority was not
applicable to the territories or to the Court's jurisdiction over cases
arising in territorial courts.6 ' Pursuant to its plenary power over the
territories, Congress had authorized the territorial assemblies to legis-
late on "'all rightful subjects of legislation,' "62 including domestic re-
lations. The territorial legislature of Arizona had accordingly
addressed the subject of domestic relations and had properly assigned
original jurisdiction over divorce actions to the territorial courts.
63
53. Id. at 209-10.
54. Id. at 206.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 205-09. Justice Field emphasized the legislature's monopoly of power over
domestic relations:
Marriage. . . has always been subject to the control of the legislature. That body
prescribes the age at which parties may contract to marry, the procedure or form
essential to constitute marriage, the duties and obligations it creates, its effects
upon the property rights of both, present and prospective and the act which may
constitute grounds for its dissolution.
Id. at 205.
57. 175 U.S. 162 (1899).
58. Id. at 163.
59. Id. at 165.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 167-68.




In contrast, the Court's description in Simms of the authority of
the general federal courts reaffirmed the domestic relations limitation.
After quoting the Barber dictum,64 the Court stated:
It may. . . be assumed as indubitable that the Circuit Courts of the
United States have no jurisdiction, either of suits for divorce, or of
claims for alimony, whether made in a suit for divorce, or by an orig-
inal proceeding in equity, before a decre& for such alimony in a state
court. Within the States of the Union, the whole subject of the do-
mestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to
the laws of the State, and not to the laws of the United States.
65
In Simms, as in In re Burrus, the Court blended the question of
applicable substantive law with the question of judicial jurisdiction.
The quoted passage suggests that because state law controls in the do-
mestic relations area, the federal courts are without power to entertain
domestic relations cases. That suggestion, of course, could be applied
to invalidate all exercises of jurisdiction based on diversity of
citizenship.
Although the domestic relations exception did not apply to the
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction in Simms, the Court neverthe-
less held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the Arizona court's denial
of the divorce.66 The Court explained that the decree could not be re-
viewed because the question of the marriage dissolution "was a matter
the value of which could not be estimated in money. ' 67 On the other
hand, the decree for alimony and counsel fees, viewed as a distinct and
severable judgment, clearly satisfied the jurisdictional amount and was
reviewed on the merits.
68
In De La Rama v. De La Rama69 the Court again considered the
merits of a territorial divorce dispute. In that case, the Supreme Court
reversed a ruling of the Supreme Court of the Phillipines on the merits
and reinstated the lower court's divorce decree and award of prop-
erty.70 Noting that the case presented "[a]n important question of juris-
diction"71 the Court stated:
64. See supra text accompanying note 31.
65. Simms, 175 U.S. at 167 (citing In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593, 594 (1890)).
66. Id. at 168.
67. Id. at 168-69. At the time of the decision, the statutory prerequisites for the
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction included an amount in controversy requirement. Act
of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 22, 1 Stat. 73. The Court also denied jurisdiction over the divorce
because it involved "mere questions of fact" that the Court was not then authorized to reex-
amine. Simms, 175 U.S. at 169.
68. Simms, 175 U.S. at 169.
69. 201 U.S. 303 (1906).
70. Id. at 318-19.
71. Id. at 307.
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It has been a long established rule that the courts of the United States
have no jurisdiction upon the subject of divorce, or for the allowance
of alimony, either as an original proceeding in chancery, or an inci-
dent of a divorce or separation, both by reason of fact [sic] that the
husband and wife cannot usually be citizens of different States, so
long as the marriage relation continues (a rule which has been some-
what relaxed in recent cases), and for the further reason that a suit
for divorce in itself involves no pecuniary value.
72
As in Simms, the Court sustained jurisdiction, finding the domestic re-
lations exception inapplicable to territorial courts. 73
The De La Rama Court's sole justifications for the domestic rela-
tion exception were the likely difficulty of establishing diversity and the
impossibility of meeting the jurisdictional amount in a case of pure di-
vorce.74 These rationales indicate merely technical obstacles to diver-
sity jurisdiction; the implication of the De La Rama dictum is that
there would be no jurisdictional bar in a divorce case if diversity were
established between husband and wife and the case satisfied the juris-
dictional amount requirement. As a practical matter, the two elements
of diversity jurisdiction will be met in many divorce and custody pro-
ceedings. States today recognize the ability of a wife to establish a
domicile separate from that of her husband for divorce purposes.
75
Even in 1859, a majority of the Barber Court sustained a finding that a
wife separated from her husband had acquired a separate domicile.
76
Likewise, the amount in controversy requirement will not be insur-
mountable when the divorce or custody contest includes a dispute over
property, alimony or child support.77 The amount in controversy ele-
72. Id. (citing Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1859)).
73. Id. at 308.
74. The reference to the amount-in-controversy requirement in De La Rama echoed
earlier concerns by the Court inIn re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 595 (1890) (discussed supra note
51), and in Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162, 168-69 (1899). The first suggestion that a pure
custody dispute placed no pecuniary amount in controversy was made in Barry v. Mercein,
46 U.S. (5 How.) 103, 119-20 (1847) (discussed supra note 51).
75. R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 11, at 19 (1977).
76. Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 599-600 (1859) (discussed supra note 36 &
accompanying text).
77. Even if a petition for divorce were viewed as a claim separate from a request for
property division or support, the petitioner's various claims could be aggregated in comput-
ing the amount in controversy for the entire proceeding. See generally C. WRIGHT, LAW OF
FEDERAL COURTS § 36, at 196 (4th ed. 1983) (aggregation of single plaintiffs various claims
against single defendant permitted in computing amount in controversy). In addition, if
liability for child support or alimony is placed in issue in a divorce or custody proceeding,
future payments might be includable in calculating the amount in controversy. In Thomp-
son v. Thompson, 226 U.S. 551 (1913), the Court held that potential liability for future
statutory maintenance similar to alimony satisfied the amount in controversy requirement.
Although the amounts past due totaled only half of the jurisdictional amount, the Court
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ment will effectively preclude jurisdiction under the De La Rama ra-
tionale only in the narrow case of a pure divorce or custody proceeding
where no monetary relief is sought and no property rights are at issue.
78
Even in the absence of diversity jurisdiction, the availability of federal
question jurisdiction is presumably unaffected by De La Rama.
The final Supreme Court decision in the evolution of the domestic
relations exception was Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler.79 An Ohio state
court awarded temporary alimony in a divorce action against the vice-
consul of Romania. 80 The vice-consul argued to the Supreme Court
that the state court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case because of the
constitutional designation of original Supreme Court jurisdiction over
cases "affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls,"
81
and because of the parallel statutory provision82 for exclusive federal
jurisdiction over such cases.83 The Supreme Court upheld the state
court's jurisdiction.84 In his opinion for the Court, Justice Holmes
wrote that the Constitution and statutes must be interpreted in light of
the common understanding that "'the whole subject of the domestic
relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of
the States and not to the laws of the United States'. . . and the juris-
diction of the Courts of the United States over divorces and alimony
always has been denied. ' 85 Justice Holmes concluded that the statu-
tory provision for exclusive federal jurisdiction over cases affecting am-
bassadors did not include divorce actions; Ohio courts therefore had
jurisdiction to entertain the divorce proceeding. 86
reasoned that "[t]he expectancy of life of the parties is clearly sufficient to make up the
balance." Id. at 559. The Court, moreover, made clear that the modifiability of the award
did not render the liability for future payments so speculative as to be disregarded in com-
puting the jurisdictional amount. Id. at 559-60.
78. Even in such cases it could be argued that a parent's right to child custody or a
person's right to dissolve a marriage is by definition worth more than any jurisdictional
monetary minimum. Cf. Cortright v. Resor, 325 F. Supp. 797, 809-10 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd on
other grounds, 447 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1971) (inherent value of free speech deemed equal to
any amount set for jurisdictional purposes).
79. 280 U.S. 379 (1930).
80. Id. at 382.
81. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
82. Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 24, par. 36, 36 Stat. 1093 (currently codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1351 (1982)).
83. Popovici, 280 U.S. at 382-83.
84. Id. at 383-84.
85. Id. at 383 (quoting In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593, 594 (1890)).
86. Id. at 383-84. The decision in Popovici has been described as the Supreme Court's
"first square holding in this field," HART & WECHSLER, supra note 1, at 1190, and "the most
extreme Supreme Court decision applying the domestic relations exception," 13 WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note I, § 3609, at 667. Nevertheless, the case is far from a square holding on
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As authority for his pronouncement of the domestic relations ex-
ception, Justice Holmes cited only the dicta of the earlier cases.8 7 In a
fleeting reference to the historical rationale suggested by the dissent in
Barber, Justice Holmes observed that "'Suits against consuls and vice-
consuls' must be taken to refer to ordinary civil proceedings and not to
include what formerly would have belonged to the ecclesiastical
Courts. 8 8 Justice Holmes did not otherwise provide a justification for,
or explanation of, the jurisdictional limitation.
The Historical Rationale
The historical rationale for the domestic relations exception urged
by the dissenting Justice in Barber and curtly endorsed in Popovici did
not otherwise surface in the six decisions.8 9 Nevertheless, some courts
have focused on that justification as the primary rationale for the juris-
dictional limitation.90 Unlike the justification based on lack of diver-
sity or amount in controversy, the historical rationale operates in
absolute terms: if the power of the federal courts to hear certain types
of cases is based on the historical jurisdiction of the English Chancery
courts, a lack of such power cannot be cured in individual cases today.
The historical rationale is vulnerable on several fronts. First, the
temporal courts of England had a significant, if limited, jurisdiction in
domestic relations matters.91 As recognized in Barber, the English
the domestic relations exception. The Court ruled only that the Ohio courts had jurisdiction
in the divorce case notwithstanding the constitutional provision for original Supreme Court
jurisdiction and the statutory provision for exclusive federal jurisdiction in suits against am-
bassadors. The holding that Congress had not given the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction
over divorce cases involving consuls does not amount to a holding that the federal district
courts lack all jurisdiction in such cases. See Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F.2d 1018, 1030-31
n.3 (3d Cir. 1975) (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
87. Popovici, 280 U.S. at 383.
88. Id. at 384.
89. The six decisions cited by Justice Holmes include Ohio ex rel Popovici v. Agler,
280 U.S. 379 (1930); De La Rama v. De La Rama, 201 U.S. 303 (1906); Simms v. Simms,
175 U.S. 162 (1899); In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586 (1890); Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888);
and Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1859).
90. See, e.g., Csibi v. Fustos, 670 F.2d 134, 137-38 (9th Cir. 1982); Phillips, Nizer, Ben-
jamin, Krim & Ballon v. Rosenstiel, 490 F.2d 509, 513-14 (2d Cir. 1973); see also 13 WRIGHT
& MILLER, supra note 1, § 3609, at 663 n.3; Vestal & Foster, supra note 1, at 28.
91. The overlap in jurisdiction between the temporal and ecclesiastical courts of Eng-
land was first outlined by Judge Weinstein in his widely cited opinion in Spindel v. Spindel,
283 F. Supp. 797, 802-03, 806-09 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (includes collected English precedent).
For a more recent study of the domestic relations jurisdiction of the English lay courts see
Columbia Note, supra note 25, at 1834-39. Subsequent courts have likewise questioned the
validity of the historical justification. See, e.g., Lloyd v. Loeffler, 694 F.2d 489, 491-92 (7th
Cir. 1982); Sutter v. Pitts, 639 F.2d 842, 843 (1st Cir. 1981); Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F.2d
1018, 1021-26 (3d Cir. 1975); Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin, Krim & Ballon v. Rosenstiel, 490
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chancery court would act to prevent an alimony decree from being
avoided through fraud.92 Moreover, while the power to decree divorce
was confined in most instances to the ecclesiastical courts of England
and to Parliament,93 the common law and equity courts frequently de-
cided questions of marital status incidental to the exercise of their es-
tablished jurisdiction. For example, the temporal courts often were
required to decide upon the validity of a marriage in suits involving
property rights.94 Chancery assisted the ecclesiastical courts in domes-
tic relations matters through the issuance of extraordinary writs.95
Chancery could also enforce separation agreements involving property
rights and decree separate maintenance. 96 Moreover, the chancery
court could restrain the ecclesiastical courts from exceeding their au-
thority.97 Hence, the jurisdictional divisions in the English system,
viewed as rigid barriers under the historical rationale, were in fact far
from absolute.
More importantly, the Court's interpretation of the Judiciary Act
of 1789 is flawed. In defining the authority of the federal courts under
the Act, the Court looked to the authority of the English courts at the
time of the statute's enactment.98 That rule of interpretation has not
F.2d 509, 512-14 (2d Cir. 1973). The historical rationale has been similarly questioned as it
relates to the probate exception. See Dragan v. Miller, 679 F.2d 712, 713 (7th Cir. 1982).
92. Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 590-91 (1859).
93. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *87-103. Judge Weinstein, however, brought
to light precedent indicating that the chancery court had the power to issue divorce decrees.
See Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797, 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
94. See, e.g., Pride v. Earl of Bath, 83 Eng. Rep. 755 (K.B. 1700) (in ejectment action in
which title to land depended on validity of marriage between original owners, court submit-
ted question of validity to jury). See generally authorities collected in Spindel v. Spindel,
283 F. Supp. 797, 807-08 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
95. See, e.g., Heyn's Case, 35 Eng. Rep. 288 (Ch. 1813) (writ of supplicavit issued in
action by wife ordering husband to find sureties for keeping the peace during pendency of
divorce). See generally authorities collected in Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797, 808
(E.D.N.Y. 1968).
96. See, e.g., Head v. Head, 26 Eng. Rep. 972 (Ch. 1745) (in action to enforce agree-
ment to pay separate maintenance, chancellor ordered gross sum to be paid; refused to direct
payment for future not because of lack of power but because of desire to encourage reconcil-
iation). See generally authorities collected in Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797, 808-09
(E.D.N.Y. 1968).
97. See, e.g., Exparte Turing, 35 Eng. Rep. 55 (Ch. 1812) (marriage of lunatic was void
by operation of parliamentary act; chancellor declared no action necessary by ecclesiastical
court). See generally authorities collected in Spindel v. Spindel, 383 F. Supp. 797, 809
(E.D.N.Y. 1968).
98. As the Court observed in Fontain v. Ravenel, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 369 (1854):
The courts of the United States cannot exercise any equity powers, except those
conferred by acts of Congress, and those judicial powers which the high court of
chancery in England, acting under its judicial capacity as a court of equity, pos-
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garnered unwavering adherence in other contexts. In construing the
powers of article III courts, the Supreme Court has in some areas ex-
pressly rejected the model of 1789 English judicial practice.99 More-
over, the judicially adopted principle of static conformity would seem
as ill-suited for jurisdictional formulations as was the rule of static con-
formity mandated by Congress for federal court procedure. 100 In effect,
the Court's interpretive mode required adherence to outdated jurisdic-
tional precepts. Indeed, two years before the Barber decision, the Eng-
lish Parliament deprived the ecclesiastical courts of their jurisdiction
over matrimonial cases, transferring such cases to a new court entitled
"The Court for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes."'' Thus, while fed-
eral courts in the United States looked back in time to an English judi-
cial system as it existed in 1789, that system itself had changed
significantly.
Furthermore, the English system, with its merger of church and
state, was an inappropriate model for the courts of a nation founded on
the principle of separation of church and state. 10 2 The efforts of the
sessed and exercised, at the time of the formation of the constitution of the United
States.
Id. at 384. Similarly, in Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490 (1946), Chief Justice Stone wrote
that the federal courts have "no jurisdiction to probate a will or administer an estate, the
reason being that the equity jurisdiction conferred by the Judiciary Act of 1789 and § 24(1)
of the Judicial Code, which is that of the English Court of Chancery in 1789, did not extend
to probate matters." Id. at 494.
99. In Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), Chief Justice Warren noted that the tradi-
tional ban against advisory opinions in the federal courts could not be traced to the 1789
practices of the English courts since the power of English judges to deliver advisory opinions
was well-established. Id. at 96. He concluded that modem day concepts of justiciability
derive from "the implicit policies embodied in Article III, and not history alone." Id. Like-
wise, the power of judicial review cannot be traced to English judicial practice. See M.
CAPPELLETTI, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 40-41 (1971) (suggesting
that the principle of parliamentary supremacy paradoxically helped the formation of a sys-
tem ofjudicial review in the United States, since colonial judges disregarded local legislation
not in conformity with English law).
100. Congress originally required the federal courts in actions at law to follow the proce-
dures existing in 1789 in the states in which the federal courts were located. See Act of Sept.
29, 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93, 93. This requirement of static conformity proved unsatisfac-
tory because the gradual modernization of the states' rules of procedure was unavailable to
the federal courts. The congressional solution was the Conformity Act of 1872, Act of June
1, 1872, ch. 255, 17 Stat. 192, which imposed a dynamic conformity requiring the federal
courts to adhere to the rules of procedure contemporaneously followed in the states. See
generally C. WRIGHT, supra note 77, at 399-402.
101. Act of Parliament, Aug. 28, 1857, 20 & 21 Vict. 733, ch. 85. See J. BISHOP, COM-
MENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 49 (1881).
102. See U.S. CONST. amend. 1. The irony of the federal courts' adoption of English
jurisdictional law has not gone unnoticed in the lower courts. Judge Posner commented that
"it would be odd if the jurisdiction of England's ecclesiastical courts, theocratic institutions
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Supreme Court and lower federal courts to tailor federal judicial prac-
tice to fit the English ecclesiastical-temporal duality produced a
strained conformity. Because there were no ecclesiastical courts in this
country even in colonial times, American law and equity courts had a
broader jurisdiction in family law matters than their English counter-
parts.103 Nevertheless, the federal judiciary adhered to the more re-
strictive English mode and ignored the practice in the state courts. It
would have been more logical to construe the new federal judicial
power in light of the prevailing practice in the colonies and states. 4
The modem viability of the historical rationale can also be ques-
tioned. Because the Supreme Court asserted jurisdiction over domestic
relations disputes arising in the territories, the domestic relations limi-
tation cannot be of constitutional dimension. 05 Rather, the limitation
must derive from the statutory language of the various jurisdictional
grants. When the language of the diversity statute was amended in
1948 to substitute "civil action" for "suits of a civil nature of common
law or in equity, 106 the traditional rationale lost its literal foundation
because Congress had eliminated the reference to the categories of
"law" and "equity."' 0 7 While the legislative history of the amendment
does not indicate that Congress intended to remove the domestic rela-
unlikely to be well regarded in America, should have been thought to define the limits of the
jurisdiction of the new federal courts." Lloyd v. Loeffler, 694 F.2d 489, 492 (7th Cir. 1982).
103. See generall, J. BIsHoP, supra note 101, at 56.
104. Cf. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 150 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter wrote that the concept of article III jus-
ticiability means that
a court will not decide a question unless the nature of the action challenged, the
kind of injury inflicted, and the relationship between the parties are such that judi-
cial determination is consonant with what was, generally speaking, the business of
the Colonial courts and the courts of Westminster when the Constitution was
framed.
Id. The diversity of the colonial and state judicial systems, however, would have compli-
cated reference to those systems in order to define the boundaries of federal jurisdiction over
domestic relations cases. See Lloyd v. Loeffier, 694 F.2d 489, 492 (7th Cir. 1982). Yet the
drafters of the first Judiciary Act did not hesitate to require conformity to individual state
practice in the area of civil procedure. See supra note 100.
105. The Supreme Court, as an article III court, is limited in its jurisdiction to cases and
controversies within the federal judicial power as defined by article III, and Congress may
not statutorily expand that jurisdiction beyond the perimeters of article III. See Verlinden
B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 103 S. Ct. 1962, 1970 (1983) ("Congress may not expand
the jurisdiction of the federal courts beyond the bounds established by the Constitution.").
106. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 930 (currently codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332
(1982)).
107. This argument was noted in Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F.2d 1018, 1021 (3d Cir.
1975).
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tions limitation, 08 the adoption of the term "civil action" does consti-
tute a departure from the old formalistic notions of judicial power that
are the basis of the historical rationale.
Some courts, while recognizing the weakness of the historical ra-
tionale, have construed Congress' failure explicitly to reject the Barber
dictum as congressional acquiescence in the domestic relations excep-
tion. 10 9 For example, the Second Circuit has reasoned that
Im]ore than a century has elapsed since the Barber dictum without
any intimation of Congressional dissatisfaction. It is beyond the
realm of reasonable belief that, in these days of congested dockets,
Congress would wish the federal courts to seek to regain territory,
even if the cession of 1859 was unjustified. . . . [W]e thus accept the
Barber dictum as a correct interpretation of the Congressional
grant. 1
0
Such reasoning is based on the inherently speculative assumption that
congressional inaction indicates specific congressional intent."' More-
over, the courts have given the domestic relations exception a variety of
definitions that differ in scope and effect." 2 Thus, it is impossible to
108. According to the Revisor's Notes to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, the sole purpose of the
amendment was to achieve conformity with the language of rule 2 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. See Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F.2d 1018, 1021 n.9 (3d Cir. 1975).
109. See Armstrong v. Armstrong, 508 F.2d 348, 349-350 (1st Cir. 1974); Phillips, Nizer,
Benjamin, Krim & Ballon v. Rosenstiel, 490 F.2d 509, 514 (2d Cir. 1973); Spindel v. Spindel,
283 F. Supp. 797, 801-03 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). A bill introduced in Congress in 1981 that never
got out of subcommittee would have amended 28 U.S.C. § 1332 to provide for district court
jurisdiction, without regard for amount in controversy, over civil actions brought to enforce
custody orders. H.R. 223, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. (1981). On the one hand, the failure of
Congress to enact such a provision may indicate a congressional desire to avoid an increase
in the federal court caseload. See B.C. Note, supra note 25, at 691 n.259. On the other
hand, the proposal suggests a congressional view that the amount in controversy limitation is
the only obstacle standing in the way of federal court jurisdiction over custody disputes.
110. Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin, Krim & Ballon v. Rosenstiel, 490 F.2d 509, 514 (2d Cir.
1973).
111. The Court has described the weight to be given congressional silence as follows:
It would require very persuasive circumstances enveloping Congressional silence
to debar this Court from reexamining its own doctrines." It is at best treacherous
to find in Congressional silence alone the adoption of a controlling rule of
law. . . .The silence of Congress and its inaction are as consistent with a desire to
leave the problem fluid as they are with an adoption by silence of the rule of those
cases.
Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69-70 (1946) (citations omitted). Although Congress
is presumed to be aware of a judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpreta-
tion upon reenactment, e.g., Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580-81 (1978), legislative inac-
tion is a weak indicator of congressional intent unless there is clear proof that Congress
considered the particular interpretation. See generally 2A C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATU-
TORY CONSTRUCTION § 49.10 (1973).
112. See generally 13 WIuGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, § 3609. The courts also disagree
as to the nature of the exception. Some courts treat the doctrine as jurisdictional while
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identify an exact exception that Congress has purportedly approved.
The Paramount Role of the States
In its modem decisions, the Supreme Court has not directly ad-
dressed the domestic relations exception, though it has often alluded to
the paramount role traditionally played by the states in domestic rela-
tions matters. " 3 Such references generally pertain to the states' author-
ity to make substantive law on the subject of marriage and divorce and
do not address the role of the federal courts in resolving domestic rela-
tions cases. 14 In one recent decision, however, the Court did discuss
the role of the federal judiciary in child custody matters. In Lehman v.
Lycoming County Children's Services Agency, 15 a parent petitioned for
writ of habeas corpus under section 2254116 on the ground that the state
statute under which the state had obtained custody of the plaintits
children was unconstitutional. 1 7 The Court held that section 2254 did
not confer federal jurisdiction over such a proceeding" 8 because the
"custody" requirement of the section had not been satisfied. 119 In sup-
others treat it as a form of discretionary abstention. See infra notes 205-08 & accompanying
text.
113. See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 103 S. Ct. 2985, 2991 (1983); Hisquierdo v. His-
quierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975); United States v.
Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966); De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580 (1956).
114. In Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979) (holding that Railroad Retire-
ment Act benefits were not subject to community property laws), the Court recognized the
traditional primacy of the states in matters of family law:
Insofar as marriage is within temporal control, the States lay on the guiding
hand .... On the rare occasion when state family law has come into conflict with
a federal statute, this Court has limited review under the Supremacy Clause to a
determination whether Congress has "positively required by direct enactment" that
state law be pre-empted .... A mere conflict in words is not sufficient. State
family and family-property law must do "major damage" to "clear and substan-
tial" federal interests before the Supremacy Clause will demand that state law be
overridden.
Id. at 581 (citations omitted).
115. 458 U.S. 502 (1982).
116. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982).
117. Lehman, 458 U.S. at 505-06.
118. Id. at 516.
119. Id. at 510-11. Section 2254(a) provides:
The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall enter-
tain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody
in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1982). The Lehman Court noted that past decisions had limited the
availability of federal habeas corpus to challenges to state criminal convictions. Ms. Leh-
man's children, the Court observed, were not suffering a restriction on liberty pursuant to a
criminal conviction nor were they in the "custody" of the state within the meaning of the
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port of the narrow construction of section 2254, Justice Powell, writing
for the Court, noted that precedent 20 suggested federal habeas corpus
was not available to challenge child custody and that the "federal
courts consistently have shown special solicitude for state interests 'in
the field of family and family-property arrangements.' "121
In a separate passage, Justice Powell emphasized "[flederalism
concerns and the exceptional need for finality in child-custody dis-
putes."122 He noted that because the federal habeas remedy provided a
federal forum unencumbered by the doctrine of res judicata, the availa-
bility of federal habeas corpus in the custody context would only pro-
long uncertainty.123 Justice Powell enigmatically concluded that "[t]he
federal writ of habeas corpus, representing as it does a profound inter-
ference with state judicial systems and the finality of state decisions,
should be reserved for those instances in which the federal interest in
individual liberty is so strong that it outweighs federalism and finality
concerns."124
While the Lehman Court broadly condemned federal court inter-
ference in child custody matters, its holding is limited to a construction
of the federal habeas corpus statute. The Lehman decision cannot be
read as affirming a general limitation on federal court jurisdiction in
child custody disputes outside the habeas corpus context. Moreover,
the federalism and finality concerns addressed by Justice Powell ordi-
narily do not determine the presence or absence of jurisdiction; rather,
they are viewed as factors influencing the discretionary exercise of
jurisdiction. 125
habeas corpus statute. Lehman, 458 U.S. at 5 10-11. The Court concluded that "[t]he 'cus-
tody' of foster or adoptive parents over a child is not the type of custody that traditionally
has been challenged through federal habeas." Id. at 511.
120. Matters v. Ryan, 249 U.S. 375, 377-78 (1919); In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 596-97
(1890).
121. Lehman, 458 U.S. at 511-12 (citing United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352
(1966)).
122. Id. at 512.
123. Id. at 513.
124. Id. at 515-16. The conclusion is enigmatic in that the ultimate holding is cast in
terms of jurisdiction: "We therefore hold that § 2254 does not confer federal court jurisdic-
tion." Id. at 516. Justice Powell does not explain why a particularly strong federal liberty
interest should supply a jurisdiction that Congress has not conferred or what such an interest
might be. Id. at 525-26 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
125. As Justice Blackmun noted in dissent, the Court traditionally has separated the
question of federal court power from the question whether federalism and other concerns
"require a federal court to forego the exercise of its habeas corpus power." Id. at 523
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 539 (1976)). The
seminal "federalism" case, Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), called for federal court
abstention based on comity and equitable restraint in actions brought to enjoin state crimi-
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The early opinions 126 from the Supreme Court and its modem
pronouncements regarding the paramount role of the states in domestic
relations matters 27 constitute the foundation of the domestic relations
exception. Notwithstanding the view of several lower courts,128 these
decisions do not deprive the federal courts of jurisdiction over all do-
mestic relations cases. The Court's actual holdings establish only that
the federal courts' exclusive jurisdiction in cases affecting ambassadors
does not include divorce proceedings,1 29 and that federal habeas corpus
jurisdiction does not extend to child custody disputes. 30 Of course, in
dicta the Court has gone much further, suggesting that federal courts
are completely without power to render basic decrees involved in mari-
tal dissolution, in part because the states have primary authority to
make substantive law in the area of domestic relations.
13'
The Court's repeated blurring of the concepts of state legislative
authority and federal judicial jurisdiction 32 has encouraged the lower
courts to apply the domestic relations exception expansively. Yet the
famous dicta giving rise to the domestic relations exception were deliv-
ered during the reign of Swif? v. Tyson, 133 the case in which Justice
Story affirmed the power of the federal courts to fashion a general com-
mon law. 134 Under the Swift doctrine the special legislative domain of
the states in domestic relations matters could be preserved only by ex-
cluding federal judicial jurisdiction. 35 After Erie Railroad Co. v.
nal proceedings, id. at 53-54, but the Court did not there suggest that such actions were
outside federal court jurisdiction.
126. See supra notes 26-88 & accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 113-14 & accompanying text.
128. Courts have referred on occasion to exceptions grounded on "the domestic rela-
tions nature" of a case, Cherry v. Cherry, 438 F. Supp. 88, 90 (D. Md. 1977), or to "a judicial
exception to federal jurisdiction.. . with respect to intra-family feuds," Bacon v. Bacon, 365
F. Supp. 1019, 1020 (D. Or. 1973).
129. Ohio ex rel. Popvici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379, 384 (1930).
130. Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 515-16
(1982); In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 596-97 (1890).
131. See De La Rama v. De La Rama, 201 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1906); Simms v. Simms,
175 U.S. 162, 167 (1899); Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 584 (1859).
132. See supra notes 50, 65 & accompanying text.
133. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
134. Id. at 18-19.
135. In Swft, Justice Story assumed the existence of a general commercial law to which
the federal courts could look for resolution of questions of a "general nature," such as "the
construction of ordinary contracts or other written instruments." Id. He construed the
Rules of Decision Act to require the application of state law only when a question was
governed by state statute or when it related to "rights and titles to things having a permanent
locality" within the state. Id. at 18. Such cases as custody disputes and interspousal prop-
erty disputes, while generally involving some statutory component, could easily include
questions of a more general nature, such as the construction of written instruments. As to
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Tompkins, 136 however, the conceptual blurring is no longer defensible.
Diversity of citizenship cases in the domestic relations field are gov-
erned by state law, and the exercise of judicial jurisdiction in such a
context does not usurp the state's legislative primacy. Domestic rela-
tions cases in federal court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction
require the application of federal substantive law, but this result is a
function of the supremacy clause, 137 not an improper displacement of
state authority. Hence, the principle that "Itihe whole subject of...
domestic relations. . . belongs to the laws of the States and not to the
laws of the United States"'138 offers little guidance on the question of
the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
Modern Characterizations of the Exception and Their
Justifications
The ambiguities in Supreme Court precedent on the domestic rela-
tions exception have left the lower courts without a sure compass. The
Court has neither defined the limits of federal court jurisdiction over
domestic relations matters nor adhered to a consistent rationale for im-
posing any limitation at all. It is uncertain to what extent a case may
involve peripheral issues of family law or intra-family disputes before
it falls within the limitation. The lower courts have extended the ex-
ception to cases in which the "primary issue" is the status of husband
and wife or parent and child, 139 as well as to cases "on the verge" of
domestic relations matters. 40 It is not clear, moreover, whether a dis-
missal, if proper at all, should be for lack of jurisdiction or pursuant to
discretionary abstention.' 4a If the limitation is viewed as jurisdictional,
the courts forego any reasoned inquiry into whether a particular do-
mestic relations case should be heard. 142 Finally, while the exception
the latter category, Justice Story's view would allow the federal court to ignore state deci-
sional law.
136. 304 U.S. 64, 76-80 (1938).
137. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
138. In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890).
139. See Csibi v. Fustos, 670 F.2d 134, 137 (9th Cir. 1982); Buechold v. Ortiz, 401 F.2d
371, 372 (9th Cir. 1968).
140. See Kilduffv. Kilduff, 473 F. Supp. 873, 875 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Phillips, Nizer, Ben-
jamin, Krim & Ballon v. Rosenstiel, 490 F.2d 509, 516 (2d Cir. 1973).
141. Recently several courts have characterized the question as one of abstention rather
than jurisdiction. See infra note 205 & accompanying text.
142. The view that domestic relations cases should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
leads to cursory dispositions. Such an approach is typified by Albanese v. Richter, 161 F.2d
688 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 782 (1947), involving an action by an illegitimate child
against his putative father. The plaintiff sought to invalidate as fraudulent an instrument
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has been invoked in federal question cases as well as diversity cases,
some courts have expressed doubt as to whether the exception should
apply at all in the former context. 14
3
Despite the uncertainty and confusion surrounding the domestic
relations "exception," three distinct rationales for the exception can be
ascertained: 1) the status-property distinction; 2) the lack ofparenspa-
rinae power; and 3) state interests and managerial concerns.
The Status-Property Distinction
In their study of the domestic relations exception, Vestal and Fos-
ter suggest that the case law could be organized around a status- prop-
erty distinction. Under their formulation, questions of marital status
would be viewed as beyond the competence of the federal courts, while
disputes over property interests would pose no jurisdiction problem. 44
In addition, Vestal and Foster explain the federal court's rejection of
jurisdiction in child custody cases as constitutional in nature: "If in
fact the states alone have the power to act asparenspatriae, then the
problem may be one not of statutory interpretation, but rather of the
Constitution itself."1 45 The Vestal and Foster approach, while helpful
in identifying the separate issues of status, property, and custody, does
not accurately reflect the Supreme Court's rulings in the area.
The Supreme Court has never held that the federal courts lack the
authority to determine the validity of a state court divorce decree, even
though such a determination will concomitantly determine marital sta-
tus. In Barber, the Court found it unnecessary to rule on the validity of
declaring defendant not to be the plaintiff's father and to require defendant to contribute to
the plaintiff's support and education. Id. at 688. The Third Circuit affirmed the district
court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, explaining that "[m]ere diversity of citizenship and
jurisdictional amount, in and of themselves, are not sufficient to give jurisdiction to federal
courts," and that the diversity statute "has been held consistently not to include suits primar-
ily involving domestic relations." Id. at 689. As authority for those broad statements, the
court cited Fontain v. Ravenel, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 369 (1854), a case involving the probate
exception to federal jurisdiction; In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586 (1890), the case construing the
habeas corpus jurisdiction of the federal courts; and Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S.
226 (1945), a case arising in state court and containing no pronouncements on district court
jurisdiction. The court's cursory disposition of the jurisdictional question and its reliance on
inapposite precedent have been criticized elsewhere. See Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F.2d
1018, 1033 (3d Cir. 1975) (Gibbons, J., dissenting); Vestal & Foster, supra note 1, at 29, 31.
Nevertheless, the Albanese decision has since been used as authority for a broad application
of the domestic relations exception. See Wilkins v. Rogers, 581 F.2d 399, 403-04 (4th Cir.
1978).
143. See, e.g., Ruffalo v. Civiletti, 702 F.2d 710, 717-18 (8th Cir. 1983) (discussed infra
note 335).
144. Vestal & Foster, supra note 1, at 28-31.
145. Id. at 36.
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an exparte divorce, but there is nothing in the language to indicate that
the federal courts would lack the power to make such a determination
when necessary. 146 Indeed, the Court later displayed a willingness to
allow federal courts to entertain questions of marital status. In Terry v.
Sharon, 147 a diversity suit had been filed in the federal circuit court for
cancellation of an allegedly forged contract of marriage. 148 When the
case reached the Supreme Court on a bill of revivor, the Court was not
troubled by the fact that the cancellation of the contract would have an
effect upon marital status: "[W]e think that the record below presents
so much of the elements of [diversity] jurisdiction as to need no further
inquiry in that direction in this proceeding.
' 149
Although the status-property rights distinction has been endorsed
by numerous lower courts,150 several decisions have explicitly rejected
the distinction. In Spindel v. Spindel,15 1 the most comprehensive court
opinion to date on the domestic relations exception, Judge Weinstein
held that the court had jurisdiction over an action to declare a Mexican
divorce invalid and to award damages for fraudulent inducement to
marry. After a close examination of the cases, Judge Weinstein con-
cluded that there were no theoretical or practical justifications for re-
fusing to entertain questions of marital status. 52 Other courts have
146. The Barber Court sustained the lower court's power to enforce a New York ali-
mony award for amounts past due, recognizing that a subsequent divorce decree rendered
by a Wisconsin court could not affect the husband's liability. The Court stated:
It is not necessary for us to pass any opinion upon the legality of the (Wisconsin]
decree, or upon its operation there or elsewhere to dissolve the vinculum of the
marriage between the defendant and Mrs. Barber. It certainly has no effect to re-
lease the defendant there and everywhere else from his liability to the decree made
against him in the State of New York ....
Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (17 How.) 582, 588 (1859).
147. 131 U.S. 40 (1889).
148. Id. at 40-41.
149. Id. at 48 (emphasis in original).
150. See, e.g., Csibi v. Fustos, 670 F.2d 134, 137 (9th Cir. 1982) (federal court lacks
jurisdiction where primary issue in case concerns status of parent and child or husband and
wife); Buechold v. Ortiz, 401 F.2d 371, 372 (9th Cir. 1968) (same); Huffman v. Nebraska
Bureau of Vital Statistics, 320 F. Supp. 154, 157 (D. Neb. 1970) (federal district court should
abstain on comity grounds from deciding issue of validity of marriage of state prisoner
pending determination by state courts).
151. 283 F. Supp. 797, 814 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
152. Judge Weinstein's criticism of the historical justification for the domestic relations
exception is discussed supra at notes 91-97 & accompanying text. He favored the rejection of
a broad jurisdictional exception, maintaining that the federal courts have an inherent duty
to exercise jurisdiction in cases assigned to them by Congress and that "[t]he mere fact that a
matter is one which has traditionally been of state concern is not sufficient to justify absten-
tion." Spindel, 283 F. Supp. at 811.
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also accepted jurisdiction of cases involving issues of status, 153 and con-
versely, there are cases involving only issues of property rights in which
the courts have invoked the domestic relations exception.'
54
The Lack of Parens Patriae Power
The Vestal and Foster theory that the federal courts, as a matter of
constitutional law, lack theparenspatriae power to make custody deter-
minations likewise is not supported by the Supreme Court cases. The
relevant custody decisions from the Court establish only that child cus-
tody disputes are not within the scope of the habeas corpus statute. 155
Vestal and Foster rely heavily on the reasoning of Judge Betts in In re
Barry,156 a circuit court decision set out in full in In re Burrus.157 Ac-
cording to Judge Betts, the federal government, and concomitantly the
federal courts, lacked the common lawparenspatriae power ordinarily
attributable to the sovereign because of the Constitution's unique allo-
cation of power. 58 Judge Betts, however, did not contend that the fed-
eral courts could never make a custody determination; he merely
argued that if the courts had such authority, it must be found in posi-
tive law rather than common law notions ofparenspatriae power.
59
153. See, e.g., Rapoport v. Rapoport, 46 F.2d 41, 43 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915
(1969); Southard v. Southard, 305 F.2d 730, 731 (2d Cir. 1962). See generalo 13 WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 1, § 3609, at 671-72 n.23. The status-property distinction was explicitly
rejected in Brandtscheit v. Britton, 239 F. Supp. 652, 654-55 (N.D. Cal. 1965). There a diver-
sity suit was filed to establish paternity and recover child support, and defendants moved to
dismiss on the basis of the domestic relations exception. Id. at 643. With regard to the
status-property distinction, the court-opined that there was "no persuasive reason why juris-
diction should be decided by such an arbitrary formula." Id. at 654. Adopting a more prag-
matic approach, the court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that "federal
courts should not meddle where they have no special competence, where there is no showing
that the state remedy is inadequate, and Congress has not clearly conferred jurisdiction."
Id. at 655. The rationales suggested in Brandischeit are themselves subject to criticism.
Federal jurisdiction has never been tied to a showing of "special competence" or inadequacy
of state remedy. See infra notes 200-02 & accompanying text.
154. See, e.g., Wilkins v. Rogers, 581 F.2d 399 (4th Cir. 1978) (domestic relations excep-
tion barred federal court from hearing case between former spouses in which wife sought
repayment of monetary advances).
155. See supra notes 44-51, 115-25 & accompanying text.
156. 42 F. 113 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1844).
157. 136 U.S. 586, 597-627 (1890).
158. Barry, 42 F. at 118-22. Judge Betts explained that the United States government,
unlike other sovereigns, "is not designed, in its organization or aim, to regulate the individ-
ual or municipal relations of the citizens. These are left to the dominion of the state govern-
ment; and there accordingly exists no relation between the nation and individuals, which
affords foundation for these prerogatives." Id. at 119.
159. Judge Betts reasoned:
The reference already made to the origin and object of our federal Union demon-
strates that no prerogative of this character could be exercised as an incident to its
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Judge Betts' reasoning rested on the principle that the federal courts,
having no common law jurisdiction, derive their authority from the
Constitution and statutes.
160
Although the federal courts do not possess a generalparenspatriae
power as representative of the sovereign,' 61 they possess plenary judi-
cial power in cases falling within their assigned jurisdiction.162 This ju-
dicial power, even if defined by reference to eighteenth century English
practice, should be deemed to include the power to affect the custody of
minors in cases properly before the court.'
6 3
In a reformulation of theparenspatriae argument, one commenta-
tor suggests that a "federal court's performance of the state's third-
party sovereign function may well transcend the powers conferred on it
by Article III" since the assumption of such a role might amount to an
impermissible exercise of nonjudicial powers and would undermine the
essential impartiality of the federal court. 164 The author offers the ex-
ample of the judge in a child custody case who, when applying the
paramount "best interests of the child" standard, acts as representative
of the state in its capacity asparenspatriae.165 Similarly, the author
notes that in many divorce actions state laws have required judges to
act as third parties to protect the state's interest in preserving the mar-
riage.' 66 Even if such third-party functions are not constitutionally
prohibited, the author argues that the federal courts should abstain in
such cases because of the risk of "unacceptable friction in federal- state
qualified and peculiar sovereignty;. . . the inherent authority of no branch of the
judiciary can transcend that of the government in this behalf, and that it has no
capacity to issue this writ, or act upon it, except under appointment by positive law.
Id. at 121-22.
160. Id. at 120.
161. See Fontain v. Ravenel, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 369, 384 (1854) ("Powers not judicial,
exercised by the chancellor merely as the representative of the sovereign, and by virtue of
the king's prerogative asparenspatriae, are not possessed by the circuit courts.").
162. Cf. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946) ("where legal rights have been invaded,
and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may
use any available remedy to make good the wrong done.").
163. The Court of Wards and Liveries, a royal court distinct from the ecclesiastical
courts, had extensive custody jurisdiction. See H. BELL, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE His-
TORY AND RECORDS OF THE COURT OF WARDS & LIVERIES 112-32 (1953). See also Colum-
bia Note, supra note 25, at 1838-39 (noting the English lay court's willingness to accept
jurisdiction over cases involving the custody and care of children). At least one federal
court, without exploring the historical antecedents, assumed that the federal courts have the
power to decree custody. See Abdul-Rahman Omar Adra v. Cift, 195 F. Supp. 857, 866 (D.
Md. 1961) (discussed infra note 242).
164. See Columbia Note, supra note 25, at 1852.
165. Id. at 1859.
166. Id. at 1854.
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relations." 67
Such an approach poses several problems. First, it construes arti-
cle III too rigidly. The key inquiries in determining justiciability are
"whether the duty asserted can be judicially identified and its breach
judicially determined, and whether protection for the right asserted can
be judicially molded."'168 It would seem beyond dispute that a question
of child custody, presented in an adversary context, can be resolved
according to judicially identifiable standards and through the award of
judicially manageable relief. 69 Moreover, the mandatory application
of a standard for adjudication that takes into account the interests of
third parties, such as the "best interests of the child" standard, does not
create an impermissible bias in the court. The third-party sovereign
function simply shapes the substantive rules that control the decision-
making of the court. In the analogous context of ruling on the propri-
ety of injunctive relief, the federal courts traditionally must consider
the public's interest, even if there is no advocate for that interest. 70
Thus, there is no apparent constitutional barrier to a federal court's
protection of the state's sovereign interests so long as the case satisfies
jurisdictional requirements. 17 1
Further, if viewed as a basis for federal court abstention, the third-
party sovereign function is underinclusive. For example, claims for an
award of alimony do not place the court in a third-party sovereign role
yet involve policy issues peculiarly within the province of the states.172
Precedent is of relatively little value in determining amount of alimony
since the facts of the cases are capable of infinite variation. 173 In an
area of such broad discretion, the exercise of federal court jurisdiction
167. Id. at 1852.
168. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962).
169. Indeed, at least one federal court has entertained an action for a custody determi-
nation in the first instance. See Abdul-Rahman Omar Adra v. Cleft, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D.
Md. 1961) (discussed infra note 242).
170. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312-13 (1982); Yakus v.
United States, 321 U.S. 414, 440 (1944). •
171. As authority for the argument that the assumption of a third-party role can be
viewed as an impermissible exercise of nonjudicial powers, the author relies on a passage
from Chief Justice Taney's dissent in Fontain v. Ravenel, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 369, 393 (1854)
(Taney, C.J., dissenting). See Columbia Note, supta note 25, at 1852 n.176. In that dissent,
Chief Justice Taney construed article III in a manner that has never been accepted by a
majority of the Court. See supra note 40.
172. Alimony awards generally are based on an assessment of factors, including length
of marriage; age, occupation, and financial status of the parties; and, in some circumstances,
conduct of the parties. See, e.g., Kover v. Kover, 29 N.Y.2d 408, 278 N.E.2d 886, 328
N.Y.S.2d 641 (1972).
173. Seegenerall H. CLARK, DOMESTIC RELATIONS: CASES AND PROBLEMS 436 (1974).
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might significantly undermine state policy.17
4
Finally, the concept of a third-party sovereign function is too am-
biguous to provide meaningful guidelines for the federal courts. A
court's duty to protect particular state interests in resolving a dispute is
by no means unique to the divorce and custody areas. As modem
choice of law methodologies have made clear, the application of a sub-
stantive rule of decision in any case arguably advances one or more
sovereign interests. 175 The better approach is to focus on whether fed-
eral court resolution of particular categories of cases threatens interfer-
ence with important state policies.
17 6
State Interests and Managerial Concerns
Many lower courts have eschewed the traditional rationales and
the status-property distinction and have developed more pragmatic jus-
tifications for the domestic relations limitation. Several courts have
suggested that congested federal dockets 177 and a general distaste for
domestic relations litigation 78 are reasons for dismissing the domestic
relations case. Others have pointed to the strong state interest and spe-
cial state competence in domestic relations matters and the possibility
of incompatible federal and state court decrees in cases that often fall
under continuing state court supervision. 79 Finally, some courts have
looked to state law to ascertain if the particular claim involved is within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the state courts' 80 or if the state courts
would provide an adequate remedy for the federal plaintiff.1l8
None of the proffered justifications warrants a finding of lack of
174. For a discussion of the significance of state policy, see infra notes 226-32 & accom-
panying text.
175. See R. LEFLAR, supra note 75, § 92.
176. See infra notes 217-32 & accompanying text.
177. See, e.g., Cherry v. Cherry, 438 F. Supp. 88, 90 (D. Md. 1977) ("the Court is unwill-
ing to increase the workload of this already overburdened Court by ignoring a rule that has
existed for over 100 years without any intimation of Congressional disapproval").
178. See, e.g., Thrower v. Cox, 425 F. Supp. 570, 573 (D.S.C. 1976) ("The field of do-
mestic relations is so vexatious, time-consuming and specialized that virtually every state in
the Union has established a separate system of family courts. . . [T]he federal court system
should allow them that dubious honor exclusively.").
179. See, e.g., Bennett v. Bennett, 682 F.2d 1039, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Crouch v.
Crouch, 566 F.2d 486, 487 (5th Cir. 1978); Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F.2d 1018, 1025 (3d
Cir. 1975).
180. See, e.g., Lloyd v. Loeffler, 694 F.2d 489, 493 (7th Cir. 1982). Cf. Dragan v. Miller,
679 F.2d 712, 715-16 (7th Cir. 1982) (in determining whether probate exception applies to
federal diversity case, court should look to state law to ascertain whether particular claim
falls within exclusive jurisdiction of state probate court).
181. See, e.g., Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625, 632 (6th Cir. 1978); Brandtscheit v.
Britton, 239 F. Supp. 652, 655 (N.D. Cal. 1965).
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subject-matter jurisdiction. The weakest rationales cited by lower
courts are the desire to avoid crowded court dockets and the disfavored
subject matter of domestic relations cases. Calendar control is not a
valid reason for dismissal of a case within the court's assigned jurisdic-
tion. 182 Similarly, distaste for the subject matter of a particular case is
hardly grounds for dismissal. If the federal courts were allowed to
choose among cases statutorily assigned to their jurisdiction on the ba-
sis of subjective appeal, Congress' constitutional role in establishing the
jurisdiction of the lower federal courts would be abrogated. 8 3 As the
Fourth Circuit stated in reversing a district court's dismissal of an inter-
spousal tort suit, "[s]o long as diversity jurisdiction endures, federal
courts cannot shirk the inconvenience of sometimes trading in wares
from the foul rag-and-bone shop of the heart."'
184
Special state competence in domestic relations matters likewise
should not be deemed a jurisdictional bar to litigation in federal court,
even if state law assigns certain classes of litigation exclusively to a
specialized state tribunal. While in some circumstances the presence of
claims of special concern to the state may justify a refusal by the fed-
eral court to go forward with a case,'8 5 the court's jurisdiction remains
intact once statutory prerequisites are satisfied.
The Supreme Court recognized early on that the jurisdiction con-
ferred by Congress does not depend on the vagaries of state law. In
Hyde v. Stone, 8 6 the Court addressed the issue whether a diversity ac-
tion was subject to dismissal on the ground that under state law the
plaintiff's suit had to be brought in the pending insolvency proceedings
initiated by the defendant in state court. A previous state court action
by the same plaintiff had been transferred to the insolvency proceed-
ings on that ground, and the defendant argued that the issue was res
judicata 8 7 The Supreme Court rejected the argument in language that
182. Cf. Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 342-44 (1976) (re-
mand of case to state court on ground that federal docket was too crowded was unauthorized
under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) allowing remand only if action has been removed "improvidently
and without jurisdiction").
183. Cf. Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490, 495 (1946) ("The mere fact that the district
court, in the exercise of the jurisdiction which Congress has conferred upon it, is required to
interpret state law is not in itself a sufficient reason for withholding relief to petitioner.");
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 383-87 (1821) (Supreme Court has duty to de-
cide cases within its jurisdiction without regard to desire of Court to avoid particular
questions).
184. Cole v. Cole, 633 F.2d 1083, 1089 (4th Cir. 1980).
185. See infra notes 219-32 & accompanying text.
186. 61 U.S. (20 How.) 170 (1858).
187. Id. at 173.
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forcefully protects federal court jurisdiction:
[T]his court has repeatedly decided that the jurisdiction of the courts
of the United States over controversies between citizens of different
States cannot be impaired by the laws of the States, which prescribe
the modes of redress in their courts, or which regulate the distribu-
tion of their judicial power. . . . [T]he courts of the United States
are bound to proceed to judgment, and to afford redress to suitors
before them, in every case to which their jurisdiction extends. They
cannot abdicate their authority or duty in any case in favor of an-
other jurisdiction.188
Similarly, in Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co. v. Whitton,' 89 the
Court held that diversity jurisdiction over a wrongful death claim was
not defeated by a state law restricting wrongful death claims to the
courts of the state creating the cause of action. The Court reasoned
that the wrongful death statute created a general right which could not
be withdrawn from federal cognizance by state law. 90
The principle of Hyde and Whitton was not overruled by the Erie
decision. 19 1 Erie and the Rules of Decision Act192 command that the
federal courts apply state law unless there is an applicable constitu-
tional provision, federal statute, or valid rule of federal common law. 1
93
188. Id. at 175.
189. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 270 (1871).
190. Id. at 285-87. The Court explained that "[w]henever a general rule as to property
or personal rights, or injuries to either, is established by State legislation, its enforcement by
a Federal court in a case between proper parties is a matter of course, and the jurisdiction of
the court, in such a case, is not subject to state limitation." Id. at 286. The Supreme Court
has reached a similar conclusion in the context of wholly state court litigation. In Tennessee
Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. George, 233 U.S. 354 (1914), the Court held that a localizing
provision in an Alabama statute need not be respected by a Georgia court that chose to
entertain the personal injury action despite the statute. Critical of George, Professor Currie
has argued that a state should be able to keep litigation at home if "the general courts of the
enacting sovereign are also excluded in order to promote uniform and expert enforcement."
Currie, Suitcase Divorce in the Conflict of Laws: Simons, Rosenstiel, and Borax, 34 U. CHI. L.
REv. 26, 50 (1966) (emphasis added). Professor Currie's policy arguments are equally rele-
vant to a federal court's dispostion of claims assigned by state law to the exclusive jurisdic-
tion of a particular state court. See infra notes 229-32 & accompanying text. Significantly,
Professor Currie does not maintain that a state's exclusive jurisdiction statutes operate to
impair the jurisdiction of another sovereign's courts.
191. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See generally Meador, State Law and
the Federal Judicial Power, 49 VA. L. REv. 1082 (1963).
192. Section 1652 provides that "[t]he laws of the several states, except where the Consti-
tution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall
be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases
where they apply." 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1982).
193. In Erie the Court rejected the application of a federal common law of negligence
since, as Justice Brandeis observed, "[t]here is no federal general common law." Erie, 304
U.S. at 78. Specialized federal common law, on the other hand, does exist in certain areas of
unique importance to the federal government and, as such, will displace state law. See, e.g.,
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If there is a pertinent federal rule of decision in conflict with a relevant
state law, the supremacy clause mandates that the federal court apply
the federal rule. 194 Hence, a state law that assigns a particular domestic
relations action to the exclusive jurisdiction of a specialized state court
should not be deemed to override the applicable federal jurisdictional
statute.
Furthermore, under traditional Erie analysis, the court must first
determine whether the particular rule of law under consideration is
substantive or procedural.19 5 Although the distinction is often elusive,
the courts generally agree that "substantive" refers to rules creating and
defining the rights and liabilities of the parties, while "procedural" re-
fers to rules governing judicial process and modes of redress. 9 6 Under
the Erie doctrine, the issue ofjudicial jurisdiction is more appropriately
characterized as procedural than substantive: a state law that
designates a particular state court as the exclusive forum for a given
claim dictates the method of redress but does not define the underlying
right.197 Moreover, the selection of the federal forum over the state
forum should not affect the outcome of the litigation so long as the
federal court applies state law to decide the merits of the contro-
versy.' 98 Thus, even though state law may assign a claim to a specified
state court, the Erie doctrine does not diminish the federal court's statu-
tory jurisdiction. 199
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 421-27 (1964). See generally M. RED-
ISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 79-107
(1980).
194. For a discussion of the role of the supremacy clause in the Erie context, see Westen
& Lehman, supra note 20, at 315-22.
195. See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465-66, 471 (1965); Byrd v. Blue Ridge
Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 535-36 (1958); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99,
108-09 (1945). See generally Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693
(1974).
196. See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 535-38 (1958); Ely, supra
note 195, at 698. Cf. Rules Enabling Act, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 961 (1948) (codified as amended
at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982)).
197. If state law, on the other hand, strips the state courts of all jurisdiction to hear a
particular claim, then the federal courts under Erie are likewise foreclosed from hearing the
claim in a diversity suit. See Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 537-38 (1949);
Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 190-91 (1947). But see Meador, supra note 191, at 1088-
92, 1100-03.
198. The "outcome determinative" test was formulated in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,
326 U.S. 99, 108-09 (1945), to supplement the ambiguous substance-procedure dichotomy.
As a measure of the impact of a particular rule on a given claim, the test is, in a sense, an
additional method of characterizing the rule as substantive or procedural. A rule that would
determine the result in litigation such that it would influence a party's choice of forum is
"substantive" for Erie purposes. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465-69 (1965).
199. A state's designation of a specialized state court for certain claims, while not affect-
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Similarly, the availability of adequate state court remedies does
not support a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. The fact that the state
courts could entertain a particular action and give full relief does not
defeat the litigant's right to file in the federal forum, assuming that
jurisdictional prerequisites are met.2°° Moreover, the federal courts are
under no duty to dismiss a claim that is also before a state court; rather,
each tribunal may hear the claim.20 1 Indeed, concurrent jurisdiction in
state and federal court is the rule and exclusive federal court jurisdic-
tion the exception.202 Finally, the possibility of incompatible state and
federal court decrees does not affect the federal court's authority to
hear the case,203 as the very existence of diversity jurisdiction necessi-
tates federal determination of state law issues and creates the risk of
inconsistent federal and state judgments.2°4
The weaknesses of the various justifications discussed above may
account for the apparent trend of modem courts to speak in terms of
abstention rather than lack of jurisdiction when invoking the domestic
relations exception. 20 5 Instead of specifying a recognized category of
abstention, however, most courts treat the domestic relations subject
ing the federal court's jurisdiction, should figure in the court's discretionary abstention de-
termination. See infra notes 229-31 & accompanying text.
200. Although the availability of adequate state remedies may undermine a federal
plaintiff's substantive claim, see, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 676-82 (1977); Ellis
v. Hamilton, 669 F.2d 510, 514-15 (7th Cir. 1982), the federal court's jurisdiction to decide
the case on the merits remains intact. Indeed, the Supreme Court in Barber v. Barber, 62
U.S. (21 How.) 582, 592 (1859), recognized that the presence of a remedy under state law
does not affect the equity jurisdiction of the federal court.
201. See, e.g., Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800,
817 (1976) ("the pendency of an action in the state court is no bar to proceedings concerning
the same matter in the Federal court having jurisdiction"). Of course, once a final judgment
is reached in either court, that judgment is binding on the other court under ordinary princi-
ples of res judicata. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 14 (1982).
202. E.g., Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 506-08 (1962). Seegener-
ally D. CURRIE, FEDERAL COURTS 201-06 (1982).
203. Because the mere potential for conflict in the results of adjudications does not re-
quire a stay, Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 816
(1976), afortiori the potential for conflict does not strip the court of jurisdiction.
204. The Supreme Court recognized as much in Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320
U.S. 228 (1943), holding that a district court had improperly dismissed the case before it
solely because of the presence of unclear state law issues. The Court reasoned that the right
of litigants to utilize a federal forum under the diversity statute would be defeated if the
federal courts refused to exercise jurisdiction "merely because the answers to the questions
of state law are difficult or uncertain or have not yet been given by the highest court of the
state .... " Id. at 234-35.
205. See, e.g., Jagiella v. Jagiella, 647 F.2d 561, 564 n.ll (5th Cir. 1981); Sutter v. Pitts,
639 F.2d 842, 843-44 (1st Cir. 1981); Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625, 632 (6th Cir.
1978).
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matter as a sufficient basis in itself for abstaining.20 6 Similarly, several
courts have divided domestic relations litigation into two categories:
"core" and "peripheral." In "core" cases, such as a petition for divorce
or a request for child custody, the federal courts purportedly lack juris-
diction. In "peripheral" domestic relations cases, such as an inter-
spousal tort suit for interference with custody rights, the federal courts
have jurisdiction but may properly abstain.
20 7
By converting the jurisdictional limitation into a question of ab-
stention, the courts have garnered greater discretion in deciding
whether to entertain domestic relations matters.208 However, any flexi-
bility gained by this new approach is negated to the extent that courts
use the domestic relations classification as the sole basis for determin-
ing whether to abstain. The following section suggests that a balanced
analysis of traditional abstention doctrines is a more logical and theo-
retically sound method for determining whether federal court resolu-
tion of a given domestic relations matter is appropriate.
Toward a Reasoned Abstention Analysis in Domestic
Relations Cases
No valid rationale supports the view that domestic relations mat-
ters are wholly outside federal court competence.209 In some domestic
relations cases, however, a discretionary refusal to exercise jurisdiction
may be justified. This section examines illustrative federal cases and
offers guidelines for the exercise of such discretion.
The federal courts face various competing interests in domestic re-
lations cases. First, a concern for institutional integrity favors the exer-
cise of jurisdiction. In our tripartite system, Congress establishes the
206. For example, in affirming a district court's refusal to exercise jurisdiction over a
claim for modification of child support and visitation rights and for damages for alienation
of children's affection, the Fifth Circuit explained that "[t]he general inquiry is whether
hearing the claim will necessitate the court's involvement in domestic issues, i.e., whether it
will require inquiry into the marital or parent-child relationship." Jagiella v. Jagiella, 647
F.2d 561, 565 (5th Cir. 1981).
207. See, e.g., Peterson v. Babbitt, 708 F.2d 465, 466 (9th Cir. 1983); Sutter v. Pitts, 639
F.2d 842, 843-44 (1st Cir. 1981); Kilduff v. Kilduff, 473 F. Supp. 873, 874-75 (S.D.N.Y.
1979).
208. As the court observed in Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1978):
While older cases indicate that federal courts are entirely without jurisdiction to
grant divorces or award custody of children, more recent decisions hold that strong
policies of federal-state comity and deference to state expertise in the area are the
theoretical underpinnings of federal courts' refusal to consider such cases.
Id. at 632.
209. This is assuming, of course, that the action otherwise meets the jurisdictional re-
quirements of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1332 (1982).
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jurisdictional bounds of the lower federal courts.210 To the extent that
courts fashion discretionary exceptions to their statutory grants ofjuris-
diction, they blur the separation of judicial and legislative powers. As
the Supreme Court has emphasized recently, the doctrines of absten-
tion are "an extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of a Dis-
trict Court to adjudicate a controversy properly before it.' '21I Thus,
before a federal court turns away a domestic relations case otherwise
within its jurisdiction, it should be able to identify sufficiently impor-
tant countervailing interests.
The policies underlying federal jurisdiction should be considered.
It is generally believed that the Framers intended diversity jurisdiction
to provide litigants with a means of avoiding local bias in the state
courts.212 There is no apparent reason why domestic relations litigants
should be denied the choice of forum available to other litigants who
meet the requirements of the diversity statute. In fact, the perceived
need for a neutral forum may be particularly pronounced in a domestic
relations context.213 Similarly, the interests served by federal court ad-
judication of federal-question cases should not be sacrificed simply be-
cause the federal question arises in a domestic relations context.
214
On the other hand, the state courts have developed a specialized
expertise in divorce and custody matters and often provide counseling
and other services to encourage conciliatory settlement of family dis-
putes. 215 Federal court adjudication that does not involve similar pro-
cedures may undermine the substantive state policies that those
procedures were designed to implement. In addition, the public inter-
est in avoiding unnecessary or duplicative litigation and reducing con-
flict between the federal and state judicial systems is especially
vulnerable when a litigant asks one court system to second-guess the
other or to restrain the other from acting on matters within its
210. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
211. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 103 S. Ct. 927, 937
(1983) (quoting County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188 (1959)).
212. See Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809) (Mar-
shall, C.J.). Cf. Frank, Historical Bases of the Federal Judicial System, 13 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 4, 9-12 (1948).
213. See infra note 248.
214. Cf. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972) (federal courts have primary role
in enforcement of federal constitutional rights); Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Re-
strict Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498 (1974) (availability of federal trial
courts for federal claims may be constitutionally mandated).




The concerns mentioned here are applicable to all exercises of ju-
risdiction by the federal courts, but apply with particular force to do-
mestic relations cases because of the factual context in which such cases
typically arise. The several abstention doctrines incorporate these con-
cerns to varying degrees and provide a useful framework in which to
analyze individual cases.
The Burford Abstention Doctrine
The federal courts generally refuse to entertain actions that would
require them to grant an initial separation or divorce, award alimony
or child support, or determine child custody.217 While this refusal is
based primarily on questionable Supreme Court dicta,218 a valid justifi-
cation may exist under the Buf7/ord abstention doctrine. In Burford v.
Sun Oil Co. ,219 the Supreme Court sought to enjoin on state and fed-
eral law grounds an order of the Texas Railroad Commission granting
a drilling permit. State law assigned exclusive judicial review of Com-
mission actions to a single state court, thus demonstrating the state's
desire to maintain consistency in court rulings and to foster necessary
technical expertise.220 The Supreme Court held that the federal court
should have refused jurisdiction because federal court review in the
complex regulatory field of oil and gas law would unduly disrupt state
policy. 22' Burford involved primarily a factual determination of the
reasonableness of the Commission's order.
Although the scope of Burford abstention has not been clearly de-
fined, the Supreme Court has invoked the doctrine in cases presenting
issues of unique importance to the state.222 The Court has described
216. See, e.g., Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F.2d 1018, 1025 (3d Cir. 1975) (discussed infra
note 264 & accompanying text.
217. E.g., Crouch v. Crouch, 566 F.2d 486, 487 (5th Cir. 1978). See generally 13
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, § 3609.
218. See supra note 26-37 & accompanying text.
219. 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
220. Id. at 326-27.
221. Id. at 332-34.
222. Since Burford the Court has found abstention proper in cases involving such im-
portant state interests as allocation of water rights under state law, Kaiser Steel Corp. v.
W.S. Ranch Co., 391 U.S. 593 (1968) (per curiam), and the scope of a city's eminent domain
power, Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959). Thibodaux
seemingly conflicts with the Court's decision in County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co.,
360 U.S. 185 (1959), announced the same day. Although both were diversity cases involving
an eminent domain question, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's dismissal in
Frank Mashuda Co. but approved the district court's decision to stay the proceedings in
Thibodaux. The two cases are reconcilable because Thibodaux involved an important ques-
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the doctrine as applying "where there have been presented difficult
questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public
import whose importance transcends the result in the case then at
bar."223 Significantly, the Court has made clear that "the state question
itself need not be determinative of state policy. '224 Rather, 'it is suffi-
cient if the exercise of federal review "would be disruptive of state ef-
forts to establish a coherent policy with respect to a matter of
substantial public concern.
'225
Divorce actions and alimony and child custody disputes, which
typically rest on diversity jurisdiction in federal court, generally will
implicate the concerns underlying Burford abstention. The basis for
such abstention is comity-respect for, and deference to, the acknowl-
edged role of the state court to resolve disputes in areas of unique im-
portance to the state.226 The paramount role of the states in regulating,
within federal constitutional constraints, the field of domestic relations
is well settled 227: the states retain preeminent authority to establish laws
governing marriage, separation and divorce, alimony, and child cus-
tody.228 Although the typical divorce or custody dispute turns on fac-
tual issues rather than significant questions of state law, the disposition
of such cases in federal court is likely to disrupt state efforts to establish
a coherent policy regarding domestic relations. For example, a state
requirement that all separation and divorce proceedings be filed in a
specialized court229 presumably reflects state policies of achieving uni-
tion of state law while Frank Mashuda Co. presented only factual questions as the parties
had conceded the existence of eminent domain power. Presumably, the resolution of purely
factual questions under the circumstances of the Mashuda case would have no significant
bearing on public policy. See M. REDISH, supra note 193, at 240-43.
223. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814
(1976).
224. Id.
225. Id. (citing Burford as an example of such a case).
226. See County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 189 (1959) ("This
Court has also upheld an abstention on grounds of comity with the states when the exercise
of jurisdiction by the federal court would disrupt a state administrative process.") (citations
omitted).
227. See, e.g., United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966).
228. The states' paramount legislative authority, which figured centrally in the evolution
of the domestic relations exception, see supra notes 50, 65 & accompanying text, has little
relevance to the question of judicial jurisdiction but is clearly relevant to the question of
discretionary abstention. But et. B.C. Note, supra note 25, at 691-95 (arguing that increased
recognition of constitutional rights in family law indicates that the subject of domestic rela-
tions may no longer be solely a state concern).
229. Most states today have established a specialized family court division of their gen-
eral trial courts for divorce and custody disputes. See generally H. CLARK, THE LAW OF
DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 284-85 (1968). The statutes typically extend
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formity in judicial rulings and of developing judicial expertise in deal-
ing with sensitive family disputes.230 Many states have instituted
conciliation programs that manifest a policy of encouraging amicable
settlement and preserving the marriage if possible.23' Such policies
would be thwarted if the federal courts, lacking the expertise and re-
sources of the state court, were to entertain divorce and custody actions
routinely. Thus, when the state itself views the subject of domestic re-
lations as one of unique importance and has so indicated by creating
specialized forums or programs, the case for abstention is strong.
232
Yet a federal court's reliance on the Burford abstention doctrine in
refusing to hear a core domestic relations dispute is problematic. State
laws governing divorce and child custody, while comprehensive, ordi-
narily will not amount to a complex regulatory scheme of the type that
triggered abstention in Burford itself.233 Moreover, Burford involved a
the jurisdiction of the family courts to divorce, child custody, support, adoption, and other
matters related to domestic relations. See, e.g., TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1926a
(Vernon Supp. 1982).
230. Family courts have been established in an attempt to deal with the entire family
and its problems in a single system, using psychiatric and other expert help. H. CLARK,
supra note 229, at 284.
231. See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-381.01 to .21 (1976 & Supp. 1983) (court of
conciliation); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1730, 1740, 1760 (West 1980) (family conciliation
courts); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.54 (Vernon Supp. 1983) (counseling). See generally H.
CLARK, supra note 229, at 284-85.
232. Cf. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 326-27 (1941) (federal court should not
intrude when the state had established an intricate system for oil regulation and provided an
exclusive avenue for judicial review). In Lloyd v. Loeffler, 694 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1982), the
Seventh Circuit recognized the principle that the federal courts should be reluctant to enter-
tain cases that the state has committed to the exclusive jurisdiction of a state court. The
Lloyd court did not, however, expressly characterize the presence of exclusive jurisdiction
under state law as an element of Bu~ford abstention. In holding that the district court prop-
erly exercised jurisdiction over a tort action for interference with custody, Judge Posner
noted that "if under Maryland law a tort action arising out of a custody decree had to be
tried in a proceeding ancillary to the custody proceeding, this would be a strong argument
against federal jurisdiction." 1d. at 493. The court applied similar logic to a probate case in
Dragan v. Miller, 679 F.2d 712 (7th Cir. 1982). In assessing practical justifications for the
probate exception, the court observed:
If a state creates a specialized cadre of judges to administer its probate jurisdiction,
this will be a reason for interpreting the probate exception to federal diversity juris-
diction broadly in that state; the argument from relative expertness will have
greater force in such a state than in one where authority in probate matters is
exercised by courts of general jurisdiction.
1d. at 715.
233. For example, the Supreme Court has rejected the applicability of Buford to a case
involving a constitutional challenge to a state law pertaining to marriage and child support.
In Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978), plaintiffs charged that a Wisconsin statute that
prevented any resident having a dependent minor child not in his custody from marrying
without court approval violated the equal protection clause. The state officials argued that
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request for federal injunctive relief, and abstention was justified in part
by reference to the traditional principle that the availability of equita-
ble relief is always a matter of discretion.2 34 In contrast, parties to di-
vorce and custody proceedings ordinarily do not seek injunctions
against state authorities. Finally, an interpretation of Burford that en-
compasses original divorce and custody actions might lead to an expan-
sive and unwarranted use of the doctrine in tangential domestic
relations disputes.
235
Nevertheless, Burford, if narrowly confined, does provide the fed-
eral courts with a principled basis for refusing to entertain actions for
divorce and child custody. A complex regulatory scheme, while pres-
ent in Burford, is not an essential element of Burford abstention. The
Supreme Court has ordered abstention when the legal issues were
straightforward and "within the easy grasp of federal judges."2 36 Fur-
thermore, the Court since Burford has approved of abstention in legal
as well as equitable actions, without apparent concern for the absence
of equitable discretion.2 37 Instead, the common thread in the cases is
that each implicated questions of local prerogative: the allocation of
natural resources,2 38 the regulation of intrastate commerce,2 39 and the
the federal district court should have refused to hear the case out of regard for the "indepen-
dence of state governments in carrying out their domestic policy." Id. at 379-80 n.5. The
Court rejected the argument with a cursory distinction of the Burford case: "Unlike Burford
. . . this case does not involve complex issues of state law." Id. Zablocki, however, should
not be read as disapproving the use of Burford abstention in core domestic relations dis-
putes. The Zablocki plaintiffs challenged the state law on federal constitutional grounds; as
the Court noted, "there is. . . no doctrine requiring abstention merely because resolution of
a federal question may result in the overturning of a state policy." Id.
234. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 332-34 (1943).
235. See Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin, Krim & Ballon v. Rosenstiel, 490 F.2d 509 (2d Cir.
1973). In Rosenstiel, the Second Circuit suggested that, although the district court had juris-
diction, it properly could have abstained under Burford from ruling on a difficult state law
question involved in a law firm's claim for attorneys' fees against a client's former husband.
Writing for the court, Judge Friendly opined that abstention would have saved the district
court from having to explore "a difficult field of New York law with which, because of its
proximity to the exception for matrimonial actions, federal judges are more than ordinarily
unfamiliar." Id. at 515-16. Contrary to the famous jurist's suggestion, reliance on Burford
abstention in this context seems misplaced. A federal court's resolution of a private dispute
over attorneys' fees, as in Rosenstei, would not interfere with the exercise of the state's
sovereign functions.
236. Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341, 361 (1951) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring) (determining whether a federal court acted appropriately in exercising
its jurisdiction by granting an injunction enjoining enforcement of a state regulatory order).
237. See, e.g., Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
238. See, e.g., Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W.S. Ranch Co., 391 U.S. 593 (1968) (per curiam);
Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
239. See Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341 (1951).
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exercise of the power of eminent domain.240 Thus the essential element
of Burford abstention is the involvement of an area of law over which
the state as a sovereign asserts a unique authority. In the domestic rela-
tions context, such authority is exercised in determinations of marital
status and custody of children.
It is important for courts to recognize that discretion, not lack of
jurisdiction, is the basis for invoking Burford abstention since under
some circumstances a core domestic relations dispute may involve is-
sues that might be more appropriately resolved in federal court. For
example, several custody contests involving children of foreign parents
have been filed in federal court, with varying results.241 In such contro-
versies, "the result in the case then at bar" may take on substantial
240. See Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
241. In Schlieffer v. Meyers, 644 F.2d 656 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 823 (1981), a
plaintiff minor child sued to enjoin the enforcement of a state court custody decree giving
effect to a Swedish custody decree that required the return of the plaintiff to the custody of
his mother in Sweden. Id. at 658. The plaintiff asserted various constitutional claims, in-
cluding the allegation of a constitutional right to remain in the United States. Id. at 662.
The Seventh Circuit rule that the case had been properly dismissed by the district court since
the plaintiff had not suffered "a judicially remediable deprivation of civil rights which...
would overcome the obstacles interposed by the Anti-Injunction Act." Id. at 665. In reach-
ing that conclusion the court emphasized the primary role of the states in domestic relations
matters. Id. at 663-64.
Similar facts were present in Bergstrom v. Bergstrom, 623 F.2d 517 (8th Cir. 1980), in
which a child sued to restrain her mother from removing her from the United States in
compliance with a custody decree of a District of Columbia court. Id. at 518. The Eighth
Circuit reversed the district court's grant of injunctive relief, holding that the constitutional
issue of the child's right to remain in the United States was not ripe for adjudication. Id. at
521. The court reasoned that reexamination of the custody decree in light of changed cir-
cumstances was a necessary first step and that such a proceeding was the exclusive province
of the appropriate state court. Id. at 519-20.
In Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1978), Vietnamese plaintiffs sued to
nullify ongoing adoption proceedings concerning four Vietnamese children who had been
evacuated from South Vietnam in 1975. Id. at 628. The appellate court affirmed the district
court's dismissal on the ground that the plaintiffs should be limited to their remedies in state
court. Id. at 632-34. The court found the considerations of comity underlying the domestic
relations exception to be particularly applicable since all issues raised in the federal action
could be resolved in the pending state proceeding. Id. at 632-33.
In another case, Walter Polovchak sued his parents in federal court claiming that his
civil rights would be violated if he were forced to return to the Soviet Union. Polovchak v.
Polovchak, No. 82-C-2327 (N.D. Ill. filed Apr. 15, 1982). The action was dismissed for
failure to prosecute because of the plaintiffs inability to serve defendants with process. Id.
(Order of Dec. 13, 1982).
Divorce cases can also present international considerations. In the original Popovici
suit for divorce in federal court, Popovici v. Popovici, 30 F.2d 185 (N.D. Ohio 1927), the
district judge dismissed on the basis of the domestic relations exception but stated that were
it not for the strong dicta from the Supreme Court, he "would be inclined to view that the
case comes within the original jurisdiction of this court. . . ." .1d. at 186.
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national significance in light of the foreign relations dimensions of the
case.242 Moreover, in international custody battles a constitutional
right to remain in the United States is often asserted.243 To the extent
that a substantial federal claim is raised, the need for deference to state
sovereignty under Burford is diminished.244 On the other hand, the
effect on state policy of federal court resolution of the infrequent inter-
national custody battle would be relatively minor.245 Thus, the consid-
erations that trigger Burford abstention would not be implicated to the
same degree as in the typical domestic dispute between United States
citizens. The discretionary nature of Burford abstention allows a fed-
eral court to take these factors into account when determining whether
to hear a case. Under a jurisdictional exception approach the court
would be forced to dismiss once it had classified the case as a core
242. In Abdul-Rahman Omar Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961), a federal
court decided a custody dispute on the merits under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350 (1976). The father, a citizen of Lebanon, brought suit against the mother, a citizen of
Iraq residing in the United States, alleging that the mother's failure to relinquish custody of
their daughter constituted a tort under Lebanese law. Cli, 195 F. Supp. at 862-63. The sole
relief requested was the return of custody of the child to the father. Id. at 863. In asserting
jurisdiction, the court noted that while the federal courts generally have declined to hear
cases involving domestic relations, none of the precedents involved an action under § 1350.
Id. at 865. The court noted that the case presented unique circumstances:
[T]his case involves, among other questions, those of nationality and entry into the
United States, with which federal courts are familiar. Plaintiff is a citizen of a
friendly nation, with which the United States has long had cultural contacts. An
alien, understandably though unjustifiably, may prefer to bring an action for a tort
in a federal court rather than in a local court, and Congress has authorized him to
do so in this limited class of cases. The importance of foreign relations to our
country today cautions federal courts to give weight to such considerations and not
to decline jurisdiction given [them] by an Act of Congress unless required to do so
by dominant considerations.
Id.
243. See, e.g., Schleiffer v. Meyers, 644 F.2d 656 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 823
(1981); Bergstrom v. Bergstrom, 623 F.2d 517 (8th Cir. 1980).
244. Although Burford abstention has been deemed appropriate in cases where a colora-
ble constitutional claim was asserted, see, e.g., Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943);
Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry. Co., 341 U.S. 341 (1951), the Supreme Court
has suggested that "the presence of a federal basis for jurisdiction may raise the level of
justification needed for abstention," Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United
States, 424 U.S. 800, 815 n.21 (1976).
245. If the jurisdictional basis of the international custody dispute is 28 U.S.C. § 1350
(1982) (alien tort) or 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982) (federal question), the substantive law to be
applied would be either "the law of nations" or federal law, and the impact on local domes-
tic relations policy accordingly would be slight. Even if the jurisdictional basis were diver-
sity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (1982), the legal issues might require
examination and application of the law of a foreign nation. The infrequency of such contro-
versies and the involvement of substantive rules other than a state's own law would mini-
mize the adverse effects of the federal courts' assumption of jurisdiction.
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domestic relations dispute even if the case implicated strong federal
interests and federal court adjudication would result in only minimal
interference with state policies.
Thus, the Burford doctrine provides the federal courts with a prag-
matic justification for refusing to entertain in the first instance claims of
divorce or separation, support, or child custody. The doctrine requires
the courts to determine whether a state has shown heightened concern
for a particular kind of case, through the creation of specialized tribu-
nals or otherwise, and whether the exercise of jurisdiction in such cases
would have an adverse impact on state policy. Unlike the current ap-
proach of many courts to the domestic relations exception, the Burford
analysis brings into focus the extraordinary nature of an abstention
order.
The Younger Doctrine-Barring Federal Injunctions
Domestic relations litigants rarely seek a divorce decree or an ini-
tial custody determination in a federal forum.246 More often, litigants
will ask the federal court to intervene in ongoing state court proceed-
ings. 247 For example, a parent engaged in a custody fight who is dissat-
isfied with the state court's handling of his or her bid for custody may
go into federal court seeking an injunction to bar the state court from
proceeding further or to otherwise direct the course of the state court
litigation.248 The request for federal relief typically will be based on
the contention that the state court has misapplied controlling state law
246. Although attempts to use the federal court as an original forum in divorce actions
are rare, an occasional divorce litigant has tried to gain access to the federal court via the
removal statutes. See, e.g., Axelson v. Summers, 369 F. Supp. 75 (D. Mo. 1973).
247. See generally 13 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note I, § 3609.
248. In Anderson v. Cramlet, No. 83-M-1156 (D. Colo. filed June 28, 1983), the plain-
tiff-father sought a federal injunction to transfer a custody battle from the Colorado state
courts to the courts of Oklahoma. The plaintiff contended that he had been denied due
process of law in an earlier Colorado court proceeding in which custody over his son had
been granted to the mother. According to the plaintiff, he found "discrimination and
prejudice" in the Colorado state courts and hoped to get a neutral hearing in the federal
forum. Rocky Mountain News, Aug. 3, 1983, at 8, col. 1. See also Bossom v. Bossom, 551
F.2d 474 (2d Cir. 1976) (action to invalidate visitation and child support stipulation incorpo-
rated in state court divorce decree). Cf. Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625 (6th Cir.
1978) (action for immediate custody of children in abrogation of adoption proceedings in
state court). A claim for injunctive relief against state court proceedings can also arise in
connection with interspousal property disputes. See Kamhi v. Cohen, 512 F.2d 1051 (2d
Cir. 1975) (action to set aside sequestration of husband's property in wife's New York di-
vorce action); Dotlich v. Kane, 497 F.2d 390 (8th Cir. 1974) (action to nullify state court
decree requiring husband to transfer homestead to wife).
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or that the state court has denied the plaintiff due process. 249
If a child custody contestant requests an injunction against pend-
ing state proceedings, two potential barriers must be overcome: the
Anti-Injunction Statute,250 and the doctrine of Younger Y. Harris.
25'
The Anti-Injunction Statute effectively precludes injunctive relief un-
less the case falls within one of the three statutory exceptions. The ex-
ception of most relevance to the domestic relations litigant is that
provided for injunctions "expressly authorized by Act of Congress.
'252
Because the Supreme Court has held that claims under section 1983253
come within the "expressly authorized" exception, 254 the Anti-Injunc-
tion Statute will not be a bar when a domestic relations litigant pleads a
colorable constitutional claim based on official state action.2 55 Con-
versely, the Anti-Injunction Statute will preclude a federal injunction
of state court proceedings when the plaintiffs claim arises solely under
state law.
Even when a litigant pleads a colorable constitutional claim so as
to come within the exception, the more imposing obstacle of Younger v.
Harris will generally bar federal relief. The Younger doctrine prohibits
249. See, e.g., Bossom v. Bossom, 551 F.2d 474 (2d Cir. 1976) (state law grounds); Dot-
lich v. Kane, 497 F.2d 390 (8th Cir. 1974) (due process grounds).
250. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982). The statute provides:
A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a
State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary
in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.
Id.
251. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
252. See 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982). The remaining two exceptions have been narrowly
construed and are of limited relevance to the domestic relations litigant. The courts gener-
ally have confined the exception for injunctions "where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction"
to in rem actions in the federal courts in which an injunction of a later state action is neces-
sary to protect property in the custody of the federal court. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 77,
at 283-84. The third exception for injunctions "to protect or effecuate its judgments" allows
the federal courts to enjoin relitigation in state court of claims that have been finally adjudi-
cated in the federal forum. See, e.g., Jackson v. Carter Oil, 179 F.2d 524 (10th Cir. 1954); C.
WRIGHT, supra note 77, at 285.
253. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. V 1981).
254. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
255. Presumably, the substantiality of the claim necessary to trigger the § 1983 exception
should be no greater than the substantiality required of a federal claim in federal question
jurisdiction. The claim need only be non-frivolous, or not clearly foreclosed by precedent.
See, e.g., Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-38 (1974). See generally 13 WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 1, § 3564. A constitutional challenge to a state court proceeding should
satisfy that standard if it includes a colorable allegation of lack of notice, inadequate oppor-
tunity to defend, bias of the tribunal, or other due process problems. For a case in which the
court subjected the plaintiff's constitutional claim to excessive scrutiny for purposes of deter-
mining the applicability of § 2283, see Schleiffer v. Meyers, 644 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1981)
(discussed supra note 241).
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a federal court from enjoining pending state court proceedings2 56 un-
less the federal plaintiff shows that he or she is the victim of official bad
faith or harassment, or that the state is acting pursuant to a patently
invalid state statute.25 7 Younger abstention rests on federalism con-
cerns and principles of equitable restraint: when the federal plaintiff
can raise his or her federal claim in the pending state court proceeding,
the intrusive remedy of a federal injunction is unwarranted.
2 5 8
Such principles squarely apply to the child custody contestant who
seeks federal court intervention in an ongoing custody dispute in the
state courts.2 59 Younger probably controls whether the federal plaintiff
seeks to enjoin the state court's consideration of the custody question or
to enjoin the enforcement of a custody decree, due to the fact that state
courts retain continous jurisdiction in custody cases.260 Even if a state
256. The extent of Younger's applicability to state civil proceedings is unclear. Younger
involved a state criminal proceeding and the Court, speaking through Justice Black, relied
heavily on the long-standing policy of equity jurisprudence against interference with crimi-
nal prosecutions. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971). Nevertheless, the Court in
subsequent cases has applied Younger to bar injunctions against a variety of state civil pro-
ceedings: attorney disciplinary proceedings, Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden
State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982) (where the Court declared the Younger doctrine
"fully applicable to noncriminal judicial proceedings when important state interests are in-
volved"); proceedings to sever parental rights, Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979); welfare
payment recovery, Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977); civil contempt proceedings,
Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977); and nuisance abatement, Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420
U.S. 592 (1975). In a child custody dispute the controversy is nominally between private
parties; the state, however, has a recognized interest in protecting the child's welfare, and the
absence of the state as a party is not determinative. See Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 335
(1977).
257. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 49, 53 (1977). A plaintiff will rarely meet the oner-
ous showing required to overcome the Younger bar. See Trainor v. Herandez, 431 U.S.
434, 463 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also M. REDISH, supra note 193, at 304-07 (dis-
cussing the narrow interpretation of the exceptions and the theoretical uncertainties of the
Younger doctrine); Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE L.J. 1103, 1115 (1977).
258. Younger, 401 U.S. at 46, 48-49. For a summary and criticism of the various feder-
alism goals served by the Younger doctrine, see M. REDISH, supra note 193, at 298-304.
259. The applicability of Younger to such a situation was recognized in Huynh Thi Anh
v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1978), in which plaintiffs challenged a pending adoption of
Vietnamese children by foster parents. Although the plaintiffs dropped their request for an
injunction staying the adoption proceedings, they sought custody of the children, relief that
would "effectively bring the adoption proceedings to a halt." Id. at 633. The court observed
that the principles of equity and comity underlying Younger were highly relevant. Id.
260. Since child custody determinations may be modified upon a showing of changed
circumstances, they have not been treated as final judgments. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Brewer,
356 U.S. 604, 608 (1958) (New York custody decrees are changeable by court in presence of
changed circumstances and therefore not afforded res judicata effect); Halvey v. Halvey, 330
U.S. 610, 612-13 (1947) (Florida custody decrees are temporary in nature since they are
subject to change by court); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 79 comment
b (1971). The federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-611,
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court has issued a "final" custody order, the custody proceeding re-
mains "pending" in the sense that the parties may at any time return to
the court for a modification. Unless the plaintiff in such a situation can
make the showing required to overcome the Younger bar, the federal
court should defer to the state court's continuing jurisdiction. Absten-
tion in such a context is warranted by the procedural posture of the
case and the extraordinary nature of the requested relief, not by the
domestic relations subject matter of the litigation.
The Colorado River Doctrine-Barring Federal Intervention
Alternatively, a domestic relations litigant may wish to obtain a
federal court ruling, without the corecive remedy of an injunction, on a
particular issue of custody, support, or property division when state
court proceedings on the same subject are pending. For example, in
Solomon v. Solomon,261 the plaintiff brought a diversity suit against her
former husband seeking damages for non-support and specific enforce-
ment of a separation agreement. At the time the plaintiff filed the fed-
eral lawsuit, a habeas corpus action concerning child custody and
visitation rights was pending in state court, and a state contempt cita-
tion against the plaintiff was outstanding. 262 Since the federal defend-
ant based his defense on the plaintiffs alleged breach of the visitation
terms of the separation agreement, the court viewed the plaintiffs claim
as dependent on a resolution of the dispute over visitation rights.
263
Construing the domestic relations exception broadly,264 the Third Cir-
§§ 6-10, 94 Stat. 3568, 3569-71 (1980) (codified in pertinent part at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982),
explicitly acknowledges the continuing nature of a custody court's jurisdiction. The Act
provides that the jurisdiction of a state court that has made a custody determination contin-
ues so long as the court has jurisdiction under state law and the child or any contestant
remains a resident of the state. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(d) (1982). For a discussion of the Act's
enhancement of the interstate enforceability of custody decrees, see infra notes 309-22 &
accompanying text.
261. 516 F.2d 1018 (3d Cir. 1975).
262. Id. at 1020-21. The parties consented in the separation agreement to submit their
visitation disputes to the state court. Id. at 1019.
263. Id. at 1026. Judge Gibbons dissented, strongly criticizing the majority's reading of
the pleadings and the separation agreement. He argued that the plaintiff had brought an
ordinary contract action regarding the purported obligation to pay child support and that
such issue was severable from the question of custody and visitation. Id. at 1028-30 (Gib-
bons, J., dissenting). If one accepts Judge Gibbons' view of the pleadings, then the district
court could properly have retained jurisdiction over the independent contract claim. See
infra notes 285-88 & accompanying text.
264. The court read the Supreme Court precedent to mean that the federal courts lack
jurisdiction in domestic relations cases with only two exceptions: federal actions to enforce
final state court judgments and Supreme Court review of territorial divorce proceedings.
Solomon, 516 F.2d at 1024. However,
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cuit held that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the action.
265
The Solomon court needlessly relied on the domestic relations ex-
ception. The abstention doctrine of Colorado River Water Conservation
District v. United States,266 although recently narrowed in scope,
267
would have applied. Colorado River counsels dismissal of a federal
court action under "exceptional circumstances" when there is concur-
rent state court litigation pending between the same parties on the same
issues. 268 Significant factors to be considered include the assumption by
one of the courts of jurisdiction over property, the relative inconven-
ience of the federal forum, the desirability of avoiding piecemeal liti-
gation, and the order in which jurisdiction was obtained by the
concurrent forums.269 In its recent consideration of the Colorado River
doctrine, the Supreme Court stated that the lower courts should also
take into account the applicable substantive law and the adequacy of
the state court remedies.270 No single factor is determinative.
271
Two of the Colorado River factors have no bearing on an analysis
of Solomon. Neither court in Solomon had assumed jurisdiction over
property, 272 and it is unclear whether one forum was significantly more
convenient than the other. The remaining factors, however, strongly
In a different case, in which the custody of no child was involved, in which there
was neither pending state court action nor an agreement to litigate in the state
courts, and in which there was no threat that a feuding couple would play one
court system off against the other, we might well assume jurisdiction.
Id. at 1025.
265. Id. at 1026-27.
266. 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
267. In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 103 S. Ct. 927 (1983),
the Court reversed a district court's stay of a federal enforcement-of-arbitration action pend-
ing resolution of a concurrent state court action involving the identical issue of arbitrability.
Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, explained that the Colorado River doctrine does not
authorize a dismissal whenever there is parallel state court litigation; rather, the decision to
dismiss must rest "on a careful balancing of the important factors as they apply in a given
case, with the balance heavily weighted in favor of the exercise of jurisdiction." Id. at 937.
268. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 818.
269. Id. at 818-19.
270. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 103 S. Ct. 927, 941-42
(1983).
271. Id. at 937 (quoting Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424
U.S. 800, 818-19 (1976)).
272. In Colorado River itself no tangible property had been brought within the jurisdic-
tion of either the state or the federal court. Nevertheless, the Court analogized the water
rights at issue there to a "res." Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 820. Similarly, it could be
argued in the custody and support context that the marital or parent-child relationship is a
res over which the state court has acquired jurisdiction. Indeed, such an argument has been
made to justify the traditional view that a state court may grant a divorce without personal
jurisdiction over the absent spouse. See J. LANDERS & J. MARTIN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 161
(1981).
March 1984] DOMESTIC RELATIONS EXCEPTION
support dismissal. The avoidance of piecemeal litigation is particularly
desirable in child custody matters when uncertainty and inconsistency
in court decrees may traumatize the contestants or the child. More-
over, as is typical in child custody disputes, the state court acquired
jurisdiction first; the dissatisfied litigant in Solomon filed her federal
suit only after the state court had held substantial proceedings on the
merits.27 3 The applicable law in Solomon was state substantive law.
Finally, there was no indication in Solomon that the state court remedy
might be inadequate to protect the federal plaintiff's rights. Thus, the
Third Circuit's invocation and ambiguous explanation of the domestic
relations exception in Solomon created an unfortunate and unnecessary
precedent.274 The court would have had a stronger basis for its holding
had it analyzed the case according to the content-neutral guidelines of
Colorado Riper.
The Pullman Doctrine-Avoiding Unnecessary Constitutional
Determinations
Finally, federal questions cases in the domestic relations context
may sometimes present a basis for abstention under the doctrine of
Railroad Commission v. Pullman.275 Under Pullman a federal district
court should abstain from deciding a constitutional claim until the state
courts have had a chance to resolve a question of state law that may be
dispositive of the case.276 A Pullman abstention order is a stay rather
than a dismissal; the federal court retains jurisdiction to afford the par-
ties an opportunity to return to the federal forum, if necessary, after
obtaining a ruling on the state question.27 7 Thus, a federal constitu-
tional claim such as a due process or equal protection challenge to a
state's domestic relations laws278 should be deferred if the claim is in-
tertwined with a potentially determinative question of state law.
The Pullman doctrine furthers the federal courts' policy of avoid-
ing unnecessary constitutional decisionmaking at considerable cost to
the litigants.279 Although the domestic relations context of a difficult
273. Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F.2d 1018, 1020-21 (3d Cir. 1975).
274. See id. at 1030-33 (Gibbons J., dissenting).
275. 312 U.S. 496 (1941). See generaly Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases.- The
Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1071 (1974).
276. Id. at 500-01.
277. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 421-22 (1964).
278. Cf. Franks v. Smith, 717 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1983) (civil rights actions challenging
warrantless invasion of plaintiffs home in connection with child custody dispute); Rhoades
v. Penfold, 694 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1983) (civil rights action challenging state's termination
of parental rights on due process grounds).
279. The delay and expense of obtaining a ruling on the state law question can be great.
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constitutional issue may make abstention particularly attractive, 280 the
courts should invoke Pullman sparingly and only according to objective
criteria. The central focus under Pullman is not the character of the
particular case,281 but whether the underlying state law question is un-
certain,282 whether resolution of the state law question may materially
change the federal issue,283 and whether the parties can obtain a rea-
sonably prompt determination on the state law question in the state
Courts.
2 8 4
When a Federal Forum Is Appropriate
Diversity Cases
Not all domestic relations cases should give rise to abstention. The
federal courts generally should exercise their jurisdiction over domestic
See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 1, at 994. See Field, supra note 275, at 1135. Indeed,
protracted delay and its consequences have frequently been given as reasons for refusing
abstention in particular cases. See, e.g., Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 537 (1965);
Griffin v. School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 228-29 (1964).
280. The domestic relations context of a particular federal claim often influences the
court's disposition of the claim. For example, in Magaziner v. Montemuro, 468 F.2d 782 (3d
Cir. 1972), plaintiff challenged state custody proceedings on due process grounds. Although
the court found that there were unresolved issues of state law underlying the claim and
therefore held abstention to be appropriate, it commented that an additional ground for
abstention was the domestic relations nature of the case. Id. at 787. Similarly, in Bergstrom
v. Bergstrom, 623 F.2d 517 (8th Cir. 1980), involving a child's suit to restrain a parent from
carrying out a custody decree, the child asserted a constitutional right to remain in the
United States. The court relied heavily on the domestic relations character of the dispute in
holding that the case should be dismissed for lack of ripeness. Id. at 520-21. See also Ellis
v. Hamilton, 669 F.2d 510, 515-16 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denieg 459 U.S. 1069 (1984). (due
process challenge to pending adoption proceeding rejected on merits on basis of availability
of adequate remedies under state law; primacy of state courts in custody matters relied on as
additional support for holding).
281. The Supreme Court has made clear in decisions rendered after Pullman that the
avoidance of unnecessary decisions of constitutional questions, rather than deference to state
policy, is the central function of Pullman abstention. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S.
374, 379-80 & n.5 (1978); Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424
U.S. 800, 814 (1976). But cf. Field, supra note 275, at 1093-96 (suggesting that a major
purpose of Pullman abstention is to avoid erroneous interference with state programs).
282. See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 402-04 (1974).
283. The question of state law must be of such a nature that resolution by the state court
might obviate the need for, or at least limit, a determination of the constitutional question.
See County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 189 (1959). See generally
HART & WECHSLER, supra note 1, at 991.
284. The Court in Pullman noted that "[tihe law of Texas appears to furnish easy and
ample means for determining the Commission's authority." Pullman, 312 U.S. at 501. The
implication of the language is that had there not been reasonable procedures available to
obtain a ruling from the state courts, abstention would have been improper. See M. REDISH,
supra note 193, at 236-37.
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relations cases involving contract and tort disputes between spouses or
former spouses. While intra-family disputes often involve issues per-
taining to the marital or parent-child relationship, the involvement of
domestic relations issues alone is insufficient to warrant a dismissal
under any of the abstention doctrines outlined above.285 For example,
in Crouch v. Crouch286 the court held that the district court properly
entertained a suit between former spouses for breach of a separation
agreement. Rejecting the argument that the lower court lacked juris-
diction, the Fifth Circuit characterized the case as one involving "little
more than a private contract to pay money between persons long since
divorced, whose children are well into adulthood. ' 287 The court noted
that there were "no questions of custody or parental rights, no pending
state court action or agreement to litigate in state court, and no threat
that the former spouses will seek to play one court system off against
the other." 288
Similarly, in Cole v. Cole289 the plaintiff sued his former wife and
two police officers for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, conspir-
acy, arson, conversion, and assault. Three counts of the complaint per-
tained to an alleged systematic plan of harassment of the plaintiff by
the former wife when the two were still married.290 In reversing the
district court's dismissal of claims against the former wife, the Fourth
Circuit observed that not all family feuds fall within the domestic rela-
tions exception. In the view of the court, the case did not present any
"true domestic relations claims"
291:
[S]ince deciding this case would not require the court either to adjust
family status or to establish duties under family- relations law or to
determine whether or not such duties had been breached, affirming
the district court with respect to the absence of subject matter juris-
285. There is, of course, ample authority to the contrary because of the ambiguities sur-
rounding the domestic relations exception. For example, Jagiella v. Jagiella, 647 F.2d 561
(5th Cir. 1981), involved an action for arrearages in alimony and child support. The court
held that the district court properly dismissed the defendant's counterclaim for alienation of
the children's affections. The court suggested that the counterclaim was inappropriate for
federal court resolution since it would "necessitate the court's involvement in domestic is-
sues," and since the allegations arose out of "the dissolved but still stormy relationship" of
the parties. Id. at 565.
286. 566 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1978).
287. Id. at 487.
288. Id. at 487-88. Claims between a spouse and a third party that only tangentially
relate to a domestic relations dispute are proper for federal court resolution. See discussion
of Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin, Krim & Ballon v. Rosenstiel, 490 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1973), supra
note 235.
289. 633 F.2d 1083 (4th Cir. 1980).
290. Id. at 1085-86.
291. Id. at 1088.
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diction would be significantly and illogically to expand the exception
to diversity jurisdiction.
292
Although the Cole court assumed the continued validity of the jurisdic-
tional exception for "pure" domestic relations claims, its willingness to
construe the exception narrowly indicates recognition of the institu-
tional duty of federal courts to entertain domestic relations cases other-
wise within their jurisdiction.293
The propriety of federal court adjudication of family tort suits for
ongoing interference with custody rights poses more difficult questions.
Many courts refuse to entertain intrafamily tort suits for interference
with custody when the dispute is related to a controversy already pend-
ing in state court.294 Some courts, on the other hand, have exercised
jurisdiction over damages claims for past violations of custody rights
but have stopped short of settling the question of present or future
rights to custody. In Bennett v. Bennett,295 for example, the plaintiff
pleaded a tortious interference with custody and sought not only dam-
ages but also an injunction directing that the child be returned to the
plaintiff. The court of appeals held that the district court should retain
jurisdiction over the damages claim but should refuse to hear the claim
for injunctive relief. 296 Although the damages claim would require the
district court to ascertain the validity and effect of conflicting state
court custody decrees, the court held that such a determination was
within the district court's competence.297 On the other hand, the major-
ity ruled that the district court would exceed its authority by issuing an
292. Id. at 1089.
293. See id. The Fourth Circuit applied the logic of Cole to exercise jurisdiction in
Wasserman v. Wasserman, 671 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1982). The district court had dismissed a
diversity suit against a former spouse for child enticement, intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, and civil conspiracy on the basis of the domestic relations exception. d. at
833. The plaintiff alleged that the former spouse had unlawfully removed the couple's chil-
dren from their state of residence during the pendency of the couple's divorce action and at
a time when the plaintiff had been awarded temporary custody. Id. The court held that the
district court had misconstrued the domestic relations exception: the complaint alleged "gen-
erally cognizable common law torts," id. at 834, and did not seek a "determination of entitle-
ment to custody or any other adjustment of family status," id. at 835.
294. See, e.g., Sutter v. Pitts, 639 F.2d 842 (Ist Cir. 1981) (affirming district court's re-
fusal to entertain action to compel compliance with prior state court custody decree); Kilduff
v. Kilduff, 473 F. Supp. 873 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (refusing to entertain damages action for viola-
tion of custody agreement and custody decree when state courts had continuing jurisdiction
over controversy). See generally 13 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, § 3609, at 665-67 ("a
federal court may well decline jurisdiction if the tortious conduct is part of an ongoing series
of disputes centering around the marital relationship").
295. 682 F.2d 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
296. Id. at 1042-44.
297. Id. at 1042.
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injunction determining future custody rights.298
As the Bennett court recognized, there is no jurisdictional or dis-
cretionary reason to dismiss a claim for damages for tortious interfer-
ence with custody so long as the requirements of the diversity statute
have been met.299 Even if the damages claim will require the federal
court to assess the validity of an earlier state court custody decree, such
a determination is within the scope of the federal judicial power.300
A claim that seeks a determination of present and future custody
rights, however, is problematic. 30 1 Because of the inherent
modifiability of custody decreees, 302 the injunction requested in Ben-
nett would have required the court to rule on the contestants' present
right to custody, independent of the earlier decree. If a claim thus re-
quires a de novo determination of custody rights, abstention under
either Colorado River 30 3 or Burford3°4 may be appropriate.30 5 A de
novo determination by the federal court could potentially conflict with
earlier state court rulings, would interfere with the continuing jurisdic-
298. Id. at 1042-44. The court explained that an injunction awarding custody would
require "an inquiry into the present interests of the minor children .... Such an inquiry is
within the peculiar province, experience and competence of the state courts." Id. at 1042-43
(footnote omitted). The court additionally noted that two state courts possibly claimed con-
tinuing jurisdiction over the custody question. Id. at 1043.
The Seventh Circuit followed the approach of the Bennett majority in Lloyd v. Loeffler,
694 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1982), which involved a similar claim of tortious interference with
custody. The Lloyd plaintiff, however, sought a cumulative punitive damages award.
Under the terms of the decree entered by the district court, an award of punitive damages
against the defendants would increase by $2000 a month until the minor child was restored
to the custody of the plaintiff, .d. at 491. See Lloyd v. Loeffler, 539 F. Supp. 998, 1006
(E.D. Wis. 1982). The Seventh Circuit in dicta disapproved of the escalating damages
award, reasoning that such an award, like an injunction, would require a determination of
present rights to custody. Lloyd, 694 F.2d at 494. In the court's view, there was a "substan-
tial question" whether the escalating award was within the district court's subject-matter
jurisdiction. Id.
299. Bennett, 682 F.2d at 1042.
300. The federal courts clearly have the power to assess the validity of state court judg-
ments, even when such judgments pertain to domestic relations. See Barber v. Barber, 62
U.S. (21 How.) 482, 590-91 (1859); Southard v. Southard, 305 F.2d 730 (2d Cir. 1962); Spin-
del v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
301. In Bennett, Judge Edwards argued in his dissent that the injunction would require
the district court only to give effect to a state court custody decree and not to inquire into the
present best interests of the children. Bennett, 682 F.2d at 1045 (Edwards, J., dissenting).
Judge Edwards' position overlooks the traditional view of custody decrees as nonfinal deter-
minations subject to future modification in the child's best interest. See supra note 260.
302. See supra note 260.
303. See supra notes 266-74 & accompanying text.
304. See supra notes 217-32 & accompanying text.
305. The Bennett court dismissed the claim for injunctive relief for lack of jurisdiction
and did not rely on the abstention doctrines.
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tion of the state court,306 and would enmesh the federal court in sensi-
tive factual questions regarding the best interests of the child.307 To be
sure, this compensatory-prospective distinction places the federal plain-
tiff in an anomolous position: he or she can sue for damages resulting
from past wrongful interference with custody rights but cannot enforce
the underlying right to recover custody.308 However, this result is a
function of the policies underlying the abstention doctrines and could
be avoided by a different choice of forum. Both a prospective determi-
nation of custody rights and compensatory relief presumably would be
available to the plaintiff in state court.
The federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980
(PKPA),30 9 by providing for interstate recognition of child custody de-
crees, may undermine the validity of the Bennett analysis, as prospec-
tive relief in custody disputes no longer requires a de novo
determination of custody rights in all cases. Under the PKPA, a state
court custody determination made consistently with the terms of the
PKPA must be enforced by the authorities of every state unless and
until a second state obtains jurisdiction to modify the decree.310 A
court may modify a custody decree from another state only if the origi-
nal state no longer has jurisdiction within the meaning of the PKPA or
has declined to exercise such jurisdiction.311 Thus, the PKPA has effec-
tively created a limited full faith and credit requirement for custody
decrees.312 A decree that is deemed valid and enforceable under the
306. See Bennett, 682 F.2d at 1043.
307. See id. at 1042-43 (discussed supra note 298).
308. As Judge Edwards noted:
Under the majority's analysis, Mr. Bennett properly may sue for the unlawful
childnapping of his son Steven and, assuming that the facts stated in his complaint
are true, Mr. Bennett may recover monetary damage. Presumably, if Mrs. Bennett
does not return Steven and a period of time passes, Mr. Bennett may sue again for
additional monetary damages arising from Mrs. Bennett's continued tortious con-
duct. At no time, however, could Mr. Bennett recover the lawful custody of
Steven.
id. at 1045 (Edwards, J., dissenting).
309. Pub. L. No. 96-611, §§ 6-10, 94 Stat. 3568, 3569-71 (1980) (codified in pertinent part
at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982)).
310. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a) (1982).
311. Id. § 1738A(f).
312. See generally Coombs, Interstate Child Custody" Jurisdiction, Recognition, and En-
forcement, 66 MINN. L. REV. 711 (1982); Foster, Child Custody Jurisdiction: UCCJI4 and
PKPA4, 27 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 297 (1981). Professor Coombs, the principal draftsman of
the Act, notes that § 1738A does not mandate claim preclusion and issue preclusion in cus-
tody modification actions. Coombs, supra, at 819. Instead, the Act commands enforcement
of custody decrees by imposing jurisdictional criteria that restrict the opportunity for inter-
state conflict.
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PKPA, ie., subject to modification only by the rendering court, should
be recognized by federal as well as state courts. Indeed, it would be
ironic if the federal courts, upon proper application, were to refuse to
enforce custody decrees entitled to interstate recognition by virtue of
federal law.
When a state court disregards an earlier decree entitled to recogni-
tion under the PKPA, a federal action to enforce compliance with the
statute is particularly appropriate. Because the PKPA authorizes juris-
diction to modify a custody decree in only one state court at a time,313 a
dispute in which two or more state courts have made inconsistent cus-
tody decrees raises a question of noncompliance with the statute. In
Flood v. Braaen,314 two different state courts had issued conflicting
custody decrees in the course of an extended interstate custody battle.
The plaintiff sued in federal court to enforce one of the decrees under
the PKPA.315 The Third Circuit held that in such a situation a federal
court may exercise jurisdiction to enforce the provisions of the
PKPA.31
6
The Flood court recognized that if two states have concurrently
rendered custody decrees, one state has asserted jurisdiction in viola-
tion of the PKPA, and "[i]dentifying the errant state under § 1738 re-
quires only preliminary inquiry into jurisdictional facts. '31 7 Thus, in
determining whether a state has improperly asserted jurisdiction under
the PKPA, a federal court need not become involved in the factual
questions of "changed circumstances" and modifiability. 318 Moreover,
because the Flood court ruled that in limited circumstances the PKPA
provides a basis for federal question jurisdiction,319 it concluded that
313. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c) (1982) (jurisdictional requirements that a state court must
meet in order to render a child custody determination); id. § 1738A(d) (continuing jurisdic-
tion in the court of an initial custody determination so long as jurisdiction exists under state
law and the state remains the residence of the child or of any contestant); id. § 1738A(f)-(g)
(exercise of concurrent juirsdiction in custody matters by two or more states is prohibited).
The effect of these provisions is to bar a second state from modifying a custody decree unless
the original state no longer has jurisdiction under the Act or has declined to exercise such
jurisdiction.
314. 727 F.2d 303 (3d Cir. 1984).
315. Id. at 306.
316. Id. at 312.
317. Id. at 310.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 312. The Third Circuit noted that the issue before it was not whether the
federal courts should be generally available for interstate enforcement of custody decrees.
Id. at 306-07. Rather, the court limited its recognition of federal question jurisdiction to the
situation in which a plaintiff has resorted to the federal court to enforce the provisions of the
PKPA in the face of noncompliance by a state court. Id. The Flood court reasoned that
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the domestic relations exception did not apply.
320
Whether or not an action to enforce a custody decree under the
PKPA "arises under" federal law for purposes of federal question juris-
diction,321 such an action implicates clear federal interests. The PKPA,
as noted by the Third Circuit in Flood, effects a major change in the
former state law approaches to custody jurisdiction322; the statute cre-
ates a uniform federal rule of interstate cooperation that is superior to
the interests of the individual states in regulating custody disputes.
Thus, neither the domestic relations exception nor the federalism poli-
cies underlying the various abstention doctrines should bar a federal
court from entertaining an enforcement action under the statute so long
as the case is otherwise within the court's jurisdiction.
Actions to enforce alimony and support decrees are also generally
appropriate for federal court adjudication. The Supreme Court estab-
lished in Barber v. Barber323 that federal courts in diversity actions may
enforce alimony awards for amounts past due. However, courts typi-
cally hold that they lack jurisdiction to determine future alimony or
denying parents a district court forum in such a situation "would come close to a judicial
repeal of those statutory rights." Id. at 312.
320. Id. at 303, 306-08.
321. Whether an action to enforce a custody decree under the PKPA comes within fed-
eral question jurisdiction is a difficult issue beyond the scope of this Article. Section 1738A
on its face contemplates only state court enforcement; there is no mention in the statute of a
role for the federal courts. Likewise, the legislative history reveals a consensus that custody
determinations should remain in the hands of the state courts. See Joint Hearing on the
Parental Kidnapping Act of 1979 Before the Subcomm. on Child and Human Development of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Child and Human Development of
the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 19-20, 71, 133
(1980). The central argument of the Flood court was that Congress could not have intended
that compliance with the new federal law on custody jurisdiction be left to "the unpoliced
discretion of the states." Flood, 727 F.2d at 312. The establishment of a federal rule of
decision, however, does not necessarily create a basis for federal question jurisdiction. In-
deed, the courts have never construed either the full.faith and credit clause or 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738 as providing a basis for federal question jurisdiction. See, e.g., Minnesota v. North-
ern Secs. Co., 194 U.S. 48,72 (1904); Luterman v. Levin, 318 F. Supp. 11 (D. Md. 1971). See
generally WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, § 3563, at 415-16. On the other hand, as Profes-
sor Coombs has noted, a state court's failure to comply with the PKPA would at least raise a
federal question entitling the complainant to seek Supreme Court review. See Coombs,
supra note 312, at 748 n.41 1. In any event, when the requirements of diversity are met, see
supra notes 75-77 & accompanying text, there are no jurisdictional or prudential reasons for
a federal court to refuse to enforce a custody decree entitled to recognition under the PKPA.
322. Flood, 727 F.2d at 311.
323. 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1859). See also Jagiella v. Jagiella, 647 F.2d 561 (5th Cir.
198 1) (district court properly exercised jurisdiction in action by former wife for alimony and
child support arrears and properly refused jurisdiction over husband's request for modifica-
tion of support obligation). See generally 13 WIuGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, § 3609, at
670-74.
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support rights or to modify an existing decree.324 The distinction may
be justified, but for reasons other than lack of jurisdiction. Because
alimony and support decrees can usually be modified upon a showing
of changed circumstances, they are not viewed as final and enforceable
judgments.325 Federal courts, like state courts, need only give to such
decrees the effect they would be given in the rendering state.32 6 Once a
federal court determines that a decree of future alimony is modifiable
and therefore nonenforceable, it could properly abstain from making a
de novo determination of support rights since such a determination
would implicate the same concerns prompting Burford abstention in
actions for initial alimony or support decrees.
327
Nevertheless, a state remains free to enforce a modifiable support
decree out of comity.328 In light of the Erie doctrine,329 a federal court
should follow the comity practice of the state in which it sits.330 Thus, if
the state would give prospective effect to a support decree issued in
another state, the federal court in a diversity case should likewise en-
force the decree. In so doing, the federal court would not thereby reex-
amine the merits of the support award or redetermine present or future
rights to support; rather, the court would simply ascertain the validity
of the decree331 and enforce it if valid.
The impact of state comity practice under Erie, while generally
ignored by the federal courts in the support context, has been recog-
nized by the Fourth Circuit. In Harrison v. Harrison,332 the court af-
324. See 13 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, § 3609, at 673-74. But see Harrison v.
Harrison, 214 F.2d 571 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 896 (1954) (federal court enforced
decree for future alimony and support) (discussed infra notes 332-34 & accompanying text).
325. See, e.g., Barber v. Barber, 323 U.S. 77 (1944); Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1 (1910);
Lynde v. Lynde, 181 U.S. 183 (1901). See generally R. LEFLAR, supra note 75, § 83. The
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, adopted in some version in every state,
does not affect the modifiability of support decrees. The Act simply implements a coopera-
tive system whereby the person to whom support is owed can initiate a support action in his
or her state of residence, and the petition and record are then forwarded to the state of the
obligor for prosecution. See generally id. § 247.
326. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 107, 109 (1971); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 86 (1982).
327. See supra notes 217-32 & accompanying text.
328. See, e.g., Worthley v. Worthley, 44 Cal. 2d 465, 283 P.2d 19 (1955).
329. See supra notes 191-99 & accompanying text.
330. Harrison v. Harrison, 214 F.2d 571 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 896 (1954). Cf.
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941) (federal court based in diversity
case must follow confficts of law rules of the state in which the federal court sits).
331. Under general principles governing recognition of judgments, the validity of the
support decree would depend on a showing of the rendering court's jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 1 (1982).
332. 214 F.2d 571 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 896 (1954).
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firmed a district court's judgment that gave prospective effect to a state
court award of alimony and support. The court observed that the
power of the federal court to enter a decree for future alimony and to
enforce such a decree through its equitable processes was "well estab-
lished. '333 Noting that the courts of Virginia, where the district court
sat, had endorsed the practice of enforcing foreign decrees for future
alimony, the Fourth Circuit concluded that Erie commanded the fed-
eral court in a diversity case to follow the same practice of comity.334
Federal Question Cases
The federal courts should be most sensitive to their institutional
obligation to accept the jurisdiction assigned to them by Congress when
considering domestic relations cases that raise substantial federal con-
stitutional or statutory claims. While most courts have expressed doubt
about whether the domestic relations exception applies in federal ques-
tion cases, 335 a few courts have suggested that the exception applies
without addressing the difference in the jurisdictional basis.336 Most
333. Id. at 573.
334. Id. at 574. The Fourth Circuit reaffirmed this approach in Keating v. Keating, 542
F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1976).
335. In Ruffalo v. Civiletti, 702 F.2d 710 (8th Cir. 1983), the plaintiff sought damages
and injunctive relief against her former husband and various federal officials for having
wrongfully included her son in the federal Witness Protection Program. Id. at 713-14. She
alleged that she had been deprived of the custody of her son in violation of the due process
clause. Id. at 713. The district court held that it could not command the return of the child
because of the domestic relations exception. Ruffalo v. Civiletti, 539 F. Supp. 949 (W.D.
Mo. 1982). In apparent disapproval of the district court's holding, the Eighth Circuit noted
that "[i]t is unclear whether the domestic relations exception applies to cases brought under
the federal-question statute." Ruffalo, 702 F.2d at 717-18 (footnote omitted). The court,
however, found it unnecessary to decide the question since the state court under the circum-
stances would be unable to grant effective relief: the power of the state court to enjoin the
federal officials was dubious, and even if such power existed, the federal officials could re-
move the case under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). Id. at 718. See also Huff v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 675 F.2d 119, 122 (6th Cir. 1982) (federal court can determine domestic relations
matters when they arise in federal question context); Rowell v. Oesterle, 626 F.2d 437, 438
(5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (domestic relations exception is no bar to federal review of
constitutional issues arising in domestic relations context).
336. In Peterson v. Babbitt, 708 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1983) (per curiam), a state prisoner
challenged as a denial of due process the state's refusal to provide him visitation rights with
his children while he remained in prison. In affirming the district court's dismissal, the
Ninth Circuit relied on the domestic relations nature of the controversy and the pendency of
a similar claim in state court. Id. at 466. The court did not address the impact of the consti-
tutional claim on the domestic relations limitation. Similarly, in LaMontagne v.
LaMontagne, 394 F. Supp. 1159 (D. Mass. 1975), the court dismissed a civil rights action
involving a custody dispute on the basis of the domestic relations exception. The court
reasoned that the "instant litigation, though dressed in constitutional clothing, is nothing
more than a domestic relations contest between two persons for custody of a child conceived
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commentators apparently have assumed that the domestic relations ex-
ception applies only to diversity jurisdiction.
337
The domestic relations limitation, of dubious validity even in di-
versity cases, is wholly inappropriate in actions founded on a federal
question. The modem justifications for the limitation, L e., the para-
mount role and special competence of the states in domestic relations
matters, 338 are of little relevance if the substantive issues in the case
arise under federal law. Indeed, the Supreme Court has suggested that
the federal courts should be more reluctant to relinquish jurisdiction
under both the Burford and Colorado River doctrines when the applica-
ble substantive law is federal.339 Hence, the mere fact that the federal
lawsuit touches an area of special state concern or duplicates pending
state court litigation should not necessarily trigger a dismissal by the
federal court if a substantial federal claim has been asserted.
Colorable federal claims involving some aspect of a state's domes-
tic relations law can assume a variety of forms, including due process
or equal protection challenges to official policy regarding the custody
or visitation rights of a particular subclass; 340 substantive due process
challenges to state statutes pertaining to marriage or divorce;34' and
procedural due process challenges to state proceedings affecting prop-
erty or custody rights.342 Of course, a federal claim presented in the
context of a request for an injunction against pending state proceedings
and born to them out of wedlock." Id. at 1160. See also Zak v. Pilla, 698 F.2d 800 (6th Cir.
1982) (per curiam) (civil rights action challenging adoption procedures dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction in part because of domestic relations exception).
337. See, e.g., 13 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, § 3609 (discussion of exception only
with regard to diversity jurisdiction); Vestal & Foster, supra note 1 (no mention of federal
question options). The proposal considered and rejected by the American Law Institute
would have codified the exception for actions "arising under" state law. See A.L.I. STUDY,
supra note 20, § 1330(2). The debates on the proposal reveal an apparent consensus that the
domestic relations exception should not apply to cases founded on a constitutional claim.
See 45 A.L.I. PROC. 117, 122, 132-33 (1968).
338. See supra text accompanying notes 177-208.
339. See supra note 244 for the suggestion that the presence of a federal claim weighs
against Burford abstention. Similarly, in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Con-
str. Corp., 103 S. Ct. 927 (1983), the Court noted that the applicability of federal substantive
law weighed against a dismissal under Colorado River.
340. See, e.g., Peterson v. Babbitt, 708 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1983); Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi,
586 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1978).
341. See, e.g., Wilkins v. Rogers, 581 F.2d 399 (4th Cir. 1978) (constitutional challenge
to state dower statute); Mendez v. Heller, 530 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1976) (constitutional chal-
lenge to state's durational residency requirement for divorce).
342. See, e.g., Rhoades v. Penfold, 694 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1983) (due process challenge
to state court proceeding permanently terminating plaintiffs parental rights).
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may be barred by Younger.343 If a constitutional claim is intertwined
with a potentially determinative question of state law, Pullman absten-
tion may be be appropriate.344 Such well-established doctrines, how-
ever, operate independently of the subject matter of the litigation.
While the federal court may enter a discretionary dismissal or stay pur-
suant to such doctrines, a refusal to exercise jurisdiction over the fed-
eral claim merely because of the domestic relations nature of the
controversy amounts to an abdication of judicial responsibility.
Conclusion
The domestic relations exception is an ingrained tradition in the
federal courts and, as such, will not be relinquished lightly. The doc-
trine not only reduces the federal case load but also saves the courts
from a distasteful category of litigation. However, the domestic rela-
tions limitation rests on dubious historical antecedents. Moreover, the
contemporary rationales for the doctrine, centering mainly on defer-
ence to state authority, do not justify the view that the federal courts
lack actual power to hear and resolve domestic relations controversies.
In the interests of institutional integrity, the courts should abandon
the domestic relations exception as a discrete jurisdictional limitation.
A domestic relations case, like other cases, should be viewed as pre-
sumptively proper for federal court resolution so long as the statutory
jurisdictional prerequisites are satisfied. The presumption may be
overcome if the particular case fits within one of the established catego-
ries of abstention.
The approach recommended here would not tranform the federal
courts into common divorce courts whenever statutory jurisdictional
requirements are met. In general, the cases considered "core" domestic
relations cases under the jurisprudence of the exception and implicat-
ing preeminent state policies could be dismissed under the Burford ab-
stention doctrine. Even such core cases, however, may sometimes
involve federal interests that justify retention of jurisdiction by the fed-
eral court. Similarly, the pendency of a related domestic relations pro-
ceeding in state court would call for a dismissal under Colorado River
in most situations. Again, however, the assertion of a substantial fed-
eral claim in federal court would weigh strongly against such a dismis-
sal. Finally, the Younger doctrine provides a workable standard for
343. See supra notes 256-60 & accompanying text.
344. See supra notes 275-84 & accompanying text.
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declining jurisdiction over domestic relations claims that would disrupt
or effectively nullify ongoing state court proceedings.
The recommended approach would require a more detailed exam-
ination of each case than that generally afforded under current practice,
but should not significantly increase the number of domestic relations
cases finally heard and resolved in federal court. The courts should
discard the simplistic framework of the jurisdictional exception in favor
of a more principled analysis comprehending the state and federal in-
terests at stake.
